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Class actions have long been thought to raise acute principal-agent
issues because the class members may have little control over the
actions of their representative in the litigation.' This concern arises
most prominently in the context of class action settlements. A widely
recognized risk is that the class counsel may in effect "sell out" or
enter into a "collusive" settlement, thus yielding the class members an
amount much smaller than the actual value of their claims.' A
number of recent class action settlements have prompted the charge
that the class members received only a small fraction of what they
would have received (in expected terms)' had the case gone to trial.4
Yet courts understandably are reluctant to discourage or abandon
class action settlements as a means for resolving large-scale mass
disputes, for the simple reason that the alternatives, class trials or
1. See Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining, Class Representation, and Fairness, 54 OHIO ST. LJ. 1, 5
(1993); Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An InstitutionalEvolutionist Perspectiv 80 CORNELL L. REV.
941, 942 (1995).
2. See genera/lyJohn C. Coffee,Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1367-75 (1995).
3. Thai is, taking into account the possibility that they would have lost at trial.
4. SeeBarry Meier, Fstful ofCoupons: Milonsfor Class-Action Layers, ScripforPlaintiffs, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 1995, at DI; Richard B. Schmitt, The Dealmakers: Some Firms Embrace the Widely
Dreaded Class-Action Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., July 18, 1996, at Al; Lawrence W. Schonbrun, Class
Actions: The New EthicalFrontier, CivilJustice Memo, Manhattan InstituteJudicial Studies Program
(Nov. 1996); see also Coffee, supra note 2, at 1359-61; Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen,
Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1057 (1996); Brian Wolfnan & Alan B. Morrison,
Representing the Unrepresented in Class Actions Seeking Monetary Relief, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 439, 441
(1996); Morawetz, supra note 1, at 5-7.
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individual litigation, generate enormous administrative costs that the
class members substantially bear themselves.'
Emblematic of this dilemma is the debate over the so-called
"settlement class action" that has recently been waged before both the
Supreme Court6 and the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. With this device, courts simultaneously certify a class in,
and approve a classwide settlement of, a set of suits brought by a large
group of plaintiffs.' This occurs even though the suits might not be
amenable to class certification for purposes of trial. Proponents of
the settlement class action tout its efficiency; it saves the costs of
resolving thousands of suits that would have to be litigated separately
were the device unavailable.9 Opponents of the procedure argue that
it is peculiarly susceptible to the problem of collusive settlement
because the defendant in effect "handpicks" the class counsel. 10
The principal-agent problem hardly is confined to the settlement
class action context, however. In any class action setting, there exists
the temptation for the defendant and the class counsel to strike a
bargain in which the class counsel, for a price, agrees to settle the
case on terms relatively disadvantageous to the class members. The
class members are often unable to protect themselves against this
danger; and courts, in policing settlements to safeguard the class
members' interests, frequently lack the information necessary to
5. See Note, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases Under Rule 23(b)(1), 96 HARv. L. REV.
1143, 1144-45 (1983).
6. In Amdzem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2244 (1997), the Supreme Court
disallowed class certification in a mass settlement of current and future claims for asbestos-
related injury, on the grounds that the proposed class failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23's issue commonality and adequacy of representation requirements. The Court did
not address the circumstances in which a class might be certified for purposes of settlement even
though it could not be certified for purposes of trial. See id. at 2247-48.
7. A proposed amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly authorizes
class certification for purposes of settlement in cases inappropriate for a class trial. SeeProposed
Amendment to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 167 F.R.D. 559, 559 (1996) (proposing
amendment to FED. R CrV. P. 23(b) (4)).
8. See Note, Back to the Drawing Board: The Settlement Class Action and Limits of Rule 23, 109
HARv. L. REv. 828, 829 (1996) (describing procedure of settlement class actions). See generally
Roger C. Cramton, IndividualizedJustice, Mass Torts, and "Settlement Class Actions": An Introduction,
80 CoRNELL L. REV. 811, 823 (1995) (defining settlement class action as device "designed to be
settled rather than litigated, with the defendant not objecting to certification of the class
providing the settlement is approved").
9. See, eg., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246,316 (E.D. Pa. 1994), vacated,
83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), aff'd sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231
(1997).
10. See In reAsbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963, 988 (5th Cir. 1996); Coffee, supra note 2, at 1378;
Letter from Steering Committee to Oppose Rule 23 (June 1, 1996) (on file with author). The
settlement struck down in Amdm had been criticized extensively for its alleged collusiveness.
See ag, Coffee, supra, at 1373-75 & n.110; Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps:
Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L REv. 1045, 1048 (1995); Koniak & Cohen,
supra note 4, at 1113.
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detect instances in which the class members are receiving less than
their claims are worth. Yet prohibiting or discouraging classwide
settlements scarcely is desirable from the class members' standpoint
because the cost savings resulting from settlement benefit them as
much as anyone else. Therefore, regardless of how the controversy
over settlement class actions is resolved, there will remain the tension
between reaping the cost savings that class settlements promise while
at the same time protecting the class members from being sold out in
the process.
This Article examines how to mediate this conflict through judicial
regulation of class counsels' fees. The Article's central theme is that
proper regulation of the counsel's fee is both necessary, and within
limits, sufficient to mediate the tension between the goals of
facilitating settlement and protecting the class against collusion. On
the one hand, effective fee regulation is a prerequisite for avoiding
collusive settlements; in many settings, alternatives to fee regulation
may furnish only weak protection for the class. On the other hand,
proper regulation of the counsel's fee can largely protect the class
against collusive settlements without blocking class settlements
altogether. In other words, effective regulation of the counsel's fee
in class settlements makes it possible to capture the benefits of
settlement, such as reduced administrative costs, without sacrificing
the interests of the class members as a group.
To develop this argument, this Article analyzes a fee regulation
technique by which the court "caps" the counsel's fee so that it does
not exceed a certain percentage of the amount the class receives."
The use of a percentage-of-the-recovery system is of course not new;
it figures prominently in existing court fee award practices. 2 The
11. See infra Parts IV-VI.
12. In early class action practice, courts typically calculated the counsel's fee on a simple
percentage-of-the award basis. See ARTHUR R. MILLER, ATTORNEY's FEES IN CLASS ACTIONS: A
REPORT TO THE FEDERALJUDICIAL CENTER 23 (1980);John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary
Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARV. L REv. 849,876 (1975) (remarking how percentage-
of-benefit formula to determine attorneys' fees has assumed prominence in past twenty years).
Since the mid-1970s, many courts have preferred to employ an hourly-rate formula. In
employing this method, however, courts apparently often check the result against an implicit
percentage-of-the award baseline, and generally award between 20% and 30% of the recovery.
See 1 ALBA CONTE, ATTORNEY FEE AwARDs 51-52 (2d ed. 1993); WilliamJ. Lynk, The Courts and
the Plantiffs'Bar Awarding the Aory's Fee in Class-Action Litigation, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 185, 209
(1994); Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking
Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L REv. 74, 155-65 (1996). As one court has observed, "[W]hat is curious
is that whatever method is used and no matter what billing records are submitted to [the court],
the result is an award that almost always hovers around 30% of the fund created by the
settlement." In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1989); see also 1
CONTE, supra, at 51-52 (noting that attorney's recovery may be closer to 5% or 10% in very large
class recoveries).
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key, however, is to identify the right percentage to award. If the
percentage is too high, class counsel will have an incentive to settle
the case for too little; if the percentage is too low, the case may not
settle at all. The optimal percentage may differ dramatically among
cases and among lawyers. This Article's intended contribution is to
derive the structure of the optimal fee cap and show how it would be
determined in practice.
Attorney's fees often occupy center stage in studies of the problem
of class action settlements. Among critics, the contention that class
members have received too little in a class settlement almost always is
accompanied by the corresponding charge that the class' counsel has
received too much; in other words, the settlement has resulted in
handsome fees for the lawyers but inadequate relief for the class
members. 3 Courts, also, worry that the prospect of earning a "juicy"
fee in settlement may give class counsel an interest in settling on
terms unfavorable to the class. 4 As a result, courts devote consider-
able energy to scrutinizing the counsel's fee in settlement to ensure
it is "reasonable" rather than "excessive" compensation.15 Yet it
appears that no court or commentator systematically has investigated
how the counsel's fee should be structured in order to give her the
proper incentives in negotiating a class settlement. 6
13. The titles of recent articles capture this concern quite vividly. See Dawson, supra note
12 ("Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation"); Koniak, supra note 10
("Feasting While the Widow Weeps"); Meier, supra note 4 ("Millions for Class-Action Lawyers,
Scrip for Plaintiffs"); see also MILLER, supra note 12, at 296.
14. SeeAlleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327,347 (2d Cir. 1964) (FriendlyJ., dissenting)
("[A] juicy bird in the hand is worth more than the vision of a much larger one in the
bush ...."). For more recent expressions of this concern, see General Motors Corp. v. Bloyed,
916 S.W.2d 949, 954 (Tex. 1996); In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods.
Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 801-05 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. CL 88 (1995); In re General
Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1131 (7th Cir. 1979).
15. See MILLER, supra note 12, at 74-185; 1 CoNTE, supra note 12, at 50-55. See generally
Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237 (1985).
16. Previous analyses have shown that the prevailing methods of calculating fee awards,
awarding either an hourly rate or a fixed percentage of the recovery, may lead counsel to settle
for too little. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the PlaintifJ's Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Themy for Private Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L
REV. 669, 717 (1986);Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attornes Role in
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1,22-23 (1991) (discussing incentives for plaintiffs' attorneys to settle for lesser amounts
on eve of trial in order to guarantee benefits while downsizing risks); see also In re General
Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d at 802. These studies have
generally not examined designing the fee to avoid this difficulty. See Macey & Miller, supra, at
105-16 (urging the auction of plaintiffs' claims to lawyers, thereby eliminating the need for a fee
at all); see also Coffee, supra, at 692.
One exception is Kevin M. Clermont &John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63
CORNELL L. REv. 529, 530 (1978), who urge a hybrid hourly-rate/percentage-of-the-award fee
as a means of solving the principal-agent problem in settlement. See id. at 530. Their analysis,
however, does not take into account the choice between settling and going to trial; indeed, their
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The absence of systematic analysis of this design problem has
produced two consequences, both potentially unfortunate. First, it
has led courts to focus on the wrong matters in regulating counsel's
fee in class settlements. Proper regulation of the fee requires the
court to adopt an ex ante perspective on settlement negotiations. In
essence, the court must ask how counsel's anticipated fee determines
her settlement demands. The conventional practice of the courts,
however, is to look at the fee award in purely expost terms. They ask,
in essence, whether a fee award represents a fair distributional share
of the amount obtained, taking the settlement amount as given, and
whether the counsel is being overpaid for the work she invested in the
case." When the objective is to protect the class against inadequate
settlements, these are the wrong questions to ask and they frequently
yield the wrong answers. A fee calculation system yielding awards that
seem entirely appropriate when viewed ex post may, nonetheless,
encourage counsel to settle for much less than the case is worth to
the class." This may well justify critics' fears that class members are
shortchanged under the current system.
Second, the lack of systematic analysis of fee design may have
fostered undue skepticism toward the use of class actions as a device
for resolving large-scale disputes. Some courts and commentators
have advocated more sparing use of the class action, particularly the
settlement class action, out of a fear of collusive settlements.1 9
Perhaps there are some inherent problems with the class action that
warrant restricting its use,' ° but the unavoidability of collusive
settlements is not one of them. The problem of collusive settlement
assumption is that there is no alternative to settling. As a result, their solution is not designed
to ensure that the plaintiffs receive as much in settlement as they would if there was no
settlement. In fact, their proposal would provide no such assurance. To protect the plaintiffs
against this danger, the fee must give the counsel no more than the fraction specified in Part
V of this Article.
17. See 1 CONTE, supra note 12, at 45-60 (providing survey and summary of courts' emphasis
on ensuring that counsel's fee is appropriate in relation to amount class receives and amount
of work done).
18. See infra note 139 and accompanying text. This point is pursued at greater length in
a separate essay. SeeBruce L Hay, Asymmetric Rewards: Why Class Actions (May) Settlefor Too Litt1
48 HASTINGS LJ. 479, 481-82 (1997).
19. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d at
801-03; Bloyed 916 S.W.2d at 952-54; Coffee, supra note 2, at 1373-74.
20. Some voice concern, for example, that the class action may be used as a blackmail
device to extort unjustified payments from the defendants. See In rRhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,
51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir.), cert. denied! 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995). Other common concerns are
that use of the class action device produces excessive costs and is unfair to individual litigants.
SeeBarry F. McNeil & Beth L. Fancsali, Mass Torts and Class Actions: FacingIncreased Scrutiny, 167
F.R.D. 483, 490-91 (1996); David Rosenberg, IndividualJustice and Collectiviting Risk-Based Claims
in Mass-Easure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 210, 252 (1996). These issues are not addressed in this
Article.
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can be fixed without jettisoning the class action device, thus making
it possible to reap the potential benefits of class treatment without
shortchanging the class in settlement.
To be sure, fee regulation is not a magic potion guaranteeing that
class members will never come up short in settlement. For instance,
getting the counsel's fee 'just right" would require the court to know,
among other things, the value of the class members' claims.21 Yet
the problem of collusive settlements arises precisely because courts
lack this information. If the court knew the value of the class
members' claims, preventing settlements that offered less than that
amount would be a trivial problem.22 The most we can ask of the
optimal fee regulation system is that it will get things approximately
right and generally counteract any incentive to settle for less than the
case is worth, without discouraging settlement altogether.
Another, perhaps more important, difficulty involves protecting
individual members or subsets of a class. The fee-capping technique
can ensure, in principle, that the class counsel does not shortchange
the group in settlement. It does not, however, solve the problem of
dividing that recovery among the class members. To the extent the
class is heterogeneous, in that some members have stronger claims
than others,2" the fee cap does not necessarily ensure that each
subclass will get the full value of its claims.24 Thus, the technique
examined here should be understood to offer protection to the group
as a whole, but not necessarily to each member of the group.25
Part I of this Article furnishes a brief overview of the problem and
provides five major analytical conclusions. Part II describes the
framework for analysis, specifying the court's objective in fee
regulation and the constraints under which it is assumed to operate.
The analysis then proceeds in five stages. In Part III, the theoretical
basis for capping the class counsel's fee in settlement is examined by
describing the incentives that would exist if the court did not regulate
the fee. In Part IV, the effects that a policy capping the class
counsel's fee creates on settlement behavior are discussed.
21. See infraPartV.
22. Because court approval is a prerequisite to effecting a settlement, courts could solve the
problem by vetoing inadequate settlements. See infra Part V.
23. If all class members are identical, an equal division of the recovery presumably solves
the distribution problem.
24. See infra Part VII.
25. For an argument that class action rules should be concerned primarily with protection
of the class as an entity, rather than with protection of individual class members, see David L.
Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Clien, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. (forthcoming 1997).
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This Article then focuses on the problem of designing the appropri-
ate fee cap. In Part V, the basic structure of the optimal cap is
derived. This analysis includes a discussion of the proper percentage
to award counsel and the central factors affecting the optimal cap.
Part VI addresses how the court would, in practice, estimate the
optimal cap in a given case. Finally, in Part VII, this analysis is
extended to settlements involving subclasses, and the limitations of
the Article's prescriptions when a single counsel represents more than
one subclass are investigated.
One further prefatory note may be in order. The analysis to follow
employs a cold-blooded assessment of attorney incentives in the class
settlement process. It focuses on the financial payoffs facing the class
counsel and proceeds on the assumption that these payoffs influence
her decisions. This does not deny that ethical considerations will, in
many cases, lead counsel to act in the class's interests even if it is not
in her financial interest. Nonetheless, it is probably inappropriate to
have the attorney's financial interest conflict with the class's interests,
so that she must choose between her own welfare and that of her
client. The purpose is simply to align, to the extent possible, the
attorney's financial interests with those of the class in the settlement
process.
I. THE FEE REGULATION PROBLEM
A. The Potential for Collusion
The central agency problem in class action settlements may be
stated simply. There is some amount of money that the class
members will recover, in expected terms, from the defendant if the
case goes to trial. The defendant and the class counsel have a
financial incentive to split that amount between themselves by settling the
case and giving the class members as little as possible.26 That is, the
defendant and the class counsel will be tempted to enter into a
settlement that leaves both class counsel and the defendant better off
than if they went to trial, at the expense of the class members.
Consider the following example. A class of plaintiffs brings suit
against a defendant If the case goes to trial, the class expects to
recover $100 million. Assume the class counsel will recover, in
expected terms, profits of $5 million. There will exist an enormous
temptation for the defendant and the class counsel to "sell out" the
26. See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Setemen4 16J. LEGAL STUD. 189,
200 (1987).
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class members, that is, to enter into a settlement that gives the class
less than $100 million. The defendant and class counsel might, for
example, agree to a settlement that gives the class counsel a payment
of $10 million, but gives only $50 million to the class members. Such
a settlement would place the class counsel and the defendant in a
much better position financially than if the case went to trial.
This risk of collusion arises out of the divergent interests between
the class members and the class counsel. Because the class counsel
does not "own" the class's claims, she has no incentive to maximize
the class's return on the claims. This problem may arise, of course,
in any litigation setting.17 Three factors, however, make it particular-
ly acute in the class action context.
First, there is no contractual relation between principal and agent.
The class typically does not "hire" class counsel.2" As a result, class
members cannot contractually protect themselves. They cannot
structure the counsel's fee in a way that ensures she will act in their
interests.29 Class counsel, therefore, has no contractual incentive to
maximize the class's recovery.
Second, the court, which is responsible for protecting the class's
interests,30 has only limited ability to detect a collusive settlement.'
When called upon to approve the settlement, the court may be highly
uncertain about the aggregate value of the class's claims, such as the
number of claimants and the strength of their claims.3 2 In addition,
the court may have difficulty assessing the true value of the settle-
ment, that is, determining how much the plaintiffs will be paid.3
Under these conditions, the court might approve a settlement that,
27. See id. at 201.
28. Some class members may have hired the class counsel as their personal lawyer, but
generally not all of them.
29. Similarly, class members cannot choose, from a group of competing lawyers, the best
contractual terms.
30. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)-(e). Most states have analogous provisions.
31. See RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF LAW 570 (4th ed. 1992).
32. See idL This is particularly true in the context of settlement class actions. See Coffee,
supra note 2, at 1380; FEDERALJUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEx LITIGATION THIRD 243-
44 (1995).
33. In many settlement agreements, the defendant creates a settlement fund to pay the
plaintiffs. Rigid eligibility requirements, however, may exist that prevent many plaintiffs from
collecting from the fund. These unclaimed funds would revert to the defendant. The court
may have difficulty assessing how onerous the eligibility requirements will be in practice, and
thus, may have difficulty ascertaining how much will actually go to the plaintiffs rather than
revert back to the defendant. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1377. Problems of determining a
settlement's value also arise when it consists of nonmonetary relief, such as vouchers or coupons
toward the purchase of some product, typically the defendant's.
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unbeknownst to the court, gives the class less than the value of its
claims.3 4
Third, the class members only have limited ability to veto or opt out
of any settlement that gives them less than the value of their
claims.3 5 Sometimes class members lack the information to assess
either the value of their claims or the quality of the settlement; 6 in
other instances, the period for opting out may have passed when the
settlement is entered. 7
An essential premise of this Article is that these factors yield a non-
negligible incentive for collusive settlements. The magnitude of this
incentive is debatable. In many settings, class counsel's financial
interests may not diverge substantially from the class members,3 8 or
the threat of judicial scrutiny or class opt out will discipline the class
counsel and defendant. For present purposes, it is enough to say that
the potential incentive for collusion is substantial.
B. The Role of Fee Regulation
The object of this Part is to determine how to counteract the non-
negligible incentive for collusion settlements through judicial
regulation of the fee that class counsel receives. Because five major
conclusions will emerge from the analysis, it may be helpful to
summarize them briefly.3 9
1. Basis for a fee cap
Where the incentive for collusive settlement is present, appropriate
fee regulation is essential to protect the class. To illustrate this point,
it suffices to ask: What would happen in an environment where the
court did not regulate the class counsel's fee? In that environment,
class counsel and the defendant would have ajoint incentive to settle
for the minimum amount the court permitted. That is, they would
have a joint incentive to arrive at a settlement that gave the class
34. It is sometimes argued thatjudges, hoping to ease their workload, are willing to approve
a settlement they believe is inadequate. I put this contention aside; whether it is true or not has
no bearing on the analysis to follow.
35. See generally George Rutherglen, BetterLate than Never:. Notice and Opt Out at the Settlement
Stage of Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 258, 290 (1996).
36. See Schuck, supra note 1, at 964-66; Wolfman & Morrison, supra note 4, at 441
(discussing how lack of information among plaintiffs mandates protection for class members
whose interests do not coincide with those of class representatives and class attorneys). An
extreme example arises in mass tort cases involving future claims of injury. Class members may
not be aware of their claim or what they will receive under the settlement. See i&, at 451-53.
37. See Rutherglen, supra note 35, at 261.
38. For example, perhaps the class counsel wants to develop a professional reputation for
effectiveness, which encourages him to obtain large recoveries.
39. For development of these points, see infra Part III.
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members the "bare minimum" that the court would approve. From
the standpoint of the defendant and class counsel, no financial reason
would exist to give the class members more than that. Any putative
settlement that gave the class members more than the "bare mini-
mum" would, in the defendant's and class counsel's view, be a waste;
they could split between themselves any excess over the "bare
minimum." As a result, the class members would tend to collect too
little on average, for two independent reasons. First, courts systemati-
cally may tend to underestimate the value of the class's claims,
thereby making the "bare minimum" too low. Second, settlement is
likely to occur when this underestimation occurs.
2. Effects of a fee cap
A rule that "caps" the class counsel's fee at a specified percentage
of the amount paid to the class members can suppress the settling
parties' joint incentive to choose the minimum allowable amount for
the class. For the class counsel to accept, a settlement must give her
at least as much as she would get if she refused to settle. The lower
that cap is, the larger the settlement amount must be in order for her
to find it acceptable. Thus, the court's imposition of a fee cap on the
class counsel encourages her to "hold out" for a relatively generous
settlement. If the fee cap is too low, however, counsel's minimum
demand will exceed the maximum amount the defendant will pay to
settle, thereby making settlement infeasible. Thus, the court's task is
to make the fee cap high enough to facilitate settlement, but low
enough to discourage the class counsel from accepting a settlement
that gives the class less than the value of its claims.4"
3. Structure of the optimal fee cap
The optimal fee cap is defined just low enough to ensure that
counsel will reject any settlement offer that would give the class
members less than the value of their claims. The value of the fee cap
depends on how much counsel would have received if there had been
no class settlement. In particular, her share of the settlement
normally should be no greater than the share of the class members'
recovery she would have received if there had been no class settlement.
This represents only an approximation of the optimal fee cap, and
the precise location will depend on a variety of additional factors."
40. See infra Part V.
41. These factors include the relative costs of settling against not settling, and risk aversion.
See Koniak & Cohen, supra note 4, at 1115-16.
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If the cap is set at this approximate point, however, settlement should:
(1) generally be feasible; and (2) give the class members at least what
they would have received if there had been no class settlement.
42
4. Identifying the optimal fee cap
If the foregoing is correct, then even if the court does not know the
value of the class members claims, in principle, it can ensure that the
class members receive the full value in settlement. The task of a court
in this situation is to estimate the share of the class members'
recovery that the counsel would have collected had there been no
class settlement. Multiplying the following two factors roughly
produces that share: (1) the fraction of the class members the
counsel would have represented if there had been no class settlement;
and (2) the fraction of each client's recovery the counsel would have
taken as her fee. The former factor may be quite small, particularly
in the context of settlement class actions. The upshot is that the
optimal fee cap may also be small, possibly a fraction of one percent.
It is likely to be larger in the context of conventional trial class actions
that settle.
5. Subclasses and the poblem of distribution
The fee cap applied to class counsel should be uniform, in the
sense that she collects the same percentage of each class member's
recovery. This is true because under a non-uniform cap, she would
have an incentive to secure larger settlements for the class members
to whom the relatively high cap applied; the remaining class members
would get the minimum allowable settlement amount.43 Under a
uniform fee cap, however, the counsel is largely indifferent to the
distribution of the settlement recovery. As a result, there is no
assurance that each class member will get the full value of her claim.
While the class as a whole will receive the full value of its claim, some
class members may ultimately receive too much, while others receive
too little. Because of counsel's indifference to distribution, there is
probably a structural bias toward overpaying plaintiffs with relatively
weak claims and underpaying those with relatively strong claims.
42. But see infra Part III (qualifying these generalizations).
43. In other words, if class counsel receives 10% of group A's recovery but only 5% of
group B's recovery, counsel and the defendant would have ajoint incentive to give group B as
little as possible.
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II. ANALYnCAL FRAMEWORK
A. A Simple Model
The following simple model will be used to analyze the fee
regulation problem. Assume a business firm markets a defective
product that causes injury to a large number of individuals. Some or
all of the victims sue the firm for compensation. The defendant seeks










Figure 1 depicts the sequence of events in the settlement process.
First, the defendant, together with counsel or potential counsel for
the class of plaintiffs, negotiates the terms of a possible classwide
settlement. Second, if the defendant and class counsel agree on
terms, they submit the proposed settlement to the court for approval.
Third, if the court approves the settlement, it becomes effective and
extinguishes the class members' claims. If the defendant and the
class counsel do not agree on terms, or if the court does not approve
the terms on which they agree, there is no classwide settlement.
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1. Negotiation process
The class representative in the negotiations is a lawyer hired by one
or more of the victims to handle individual claims. There is a pool
of potential class counsel called "candidates." This example assumes
the candidates differ in the amount they stand to receive from the
case if there is no class settlement.' There are two possible bargain-
ing scenarios. Both differ in the manner and timing by which the
class representative is chosen:
In the first scenario, the court has exclusively designated an official
class counsel before settlement negotiations have concluded. The
defendant cannot choose his negotiating partner; he is forced to deal
with the designated class counsel. There is no classwide settlement if
the defendant fails to reach agreement with the designated class
counsel.
In the second scenario, no class counsel has been officially,
exclusively designated at the time settlement negotiations have
concluded. Instead, the defendant may negotiate with several
different lawyers, each hoping to represent the class. The lawyer who
successfully negotiates a settlement and secures judicial approval
becomes class counsel. In effect, the defendant can seek competitive
bids from different "candidates" and enter into an agreement with the
one offering the most attractive settlement terms.
This latter scenario may materialize in several ways. One possibility
is that the case is in the early stages of becoming a conventional trial
class action, but no one has been designated counsel for the entire
class. A court may not have certified the class or several courts may
have separately certified the class, each naming a different class
counsel.' Another possibility is that the case will never become a
trial class action; there is simply a set of separate actions that the
defendant seeks to resolve by consolidating them into a "settlement
class action."
2. Settlement terms
For the purposes of this Article, a classwide settlement has two basic
components. First, it determines how much the class counsel will
44. These differences will reflect variations in the quantity or relative merits of the claims
each lawyer is handling in the litigation.
45. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1370 (noting phenomenon in class action litigation known
as "reverse auction" in which there is "jurisdictional competition among different teams of
plaintiff's attorneys in different actions that involve the same underlying allegations"); Geoffrey
P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 516 (1996).
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collect as her fee for negotiating the settlement. Second, it deter-
mines the amount that will be distributed to the class. As these terms
are central to the following analysis, simple notations will be used for
brevity. Let
F = the fee paid to the class counsel;
S = the total amount distributed to the class members,
net of the fee paid to the class counsel.
It should be emphasized that S represents the amount actually paid
to the class members after any deductions are made to pay the class
counsel. In other words, S is the aggregate amount that goes into
"the pockets" of the class members, and possibly their own personal
lawyers, 46 rather than into "the pockets" of class counsel.
In negotiating a settlement, one assumes that the defendant and
the class counsel bargain over, and submit to the court, a proposed
value of S and F. This is not necessarily explicit.47  A proposed
settlement may simply specify the total amount to be paid to the
defendant, leaving the court to divide this amount between the class
counsel and the class members." Even in such an instance, howev-
er, the settling parties will have some expectations about how the
court will divide the settlement amount between counsel and the
class. These expectations will, in turn, influence the amount the
parties settle for. Thus, the parties bargain implicitly, if not explicitly,
over the amount the class members ultimately will receive.
An example clarifies this point. Suppose the court will permit class
counsel to collect a fee equal to 25% of the amount distributed to the
class.49 Equivalently, the court will permit the class counsel to collect
20% of the total amount the defendant will pay."° Assume that the
46. Individual class members may have their own lawyers. These lawyers may collect as part
of a privately negotiated fee agreement some portion of the amount paid to their clients. See
Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Wthin the Aggregate: Relationships, Rresentation, and Fees, 71
N.Y.U. L. REv. 296, 312-13 (1996). This division of the proceeds from the settlement between
lawyer and client is irrelevant to this analysis because it does not raise any problems specific to
the class action setting.
47. Courts frequently discourage fee discussions in the settlement process. SeeMiller, supra
note 27, at 204.
48. This is the apportionment process that occurs when the counsel's fee is deducted from
the class recovery. See In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 749-50
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (reviewing fee awards in securities class action suits in Second Circuit), aff'd, 798
F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986).
49. Expressed another way, the court will let F= 0.25S.
50. If counsel receives 20% of the amount the defendant pays, that leaves 80% for the class
members. Thus counsel is receiving one-fourth .(25%) of the class members' award.
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defendant offers to settle the case for a total payment of 200.51 This
is equivalent to offering a value of 160 for S and 40 for F. 2 Once
the settling parties know what percentage of the settlement the court
will permit counsel to collect as her fee, any proposed total settlement
amount can be converted into a corresponding value of S and F.
Therefore, one can think of the defendant and the class counsel as
bargaining over, and proposing to the court, the value of these two
terms.
For similar reasons, it makes no difference whether one thinks of
the class members as paying the counsel's fee, which is deducted from
their recovery, or the defendant as paying it on top of the class's
recovery. This will have no bearing on the ultimate terms of the
settlement because the settling parties will adjust their behavior
depending on the fee award policy. Returning to the example above,
assume that the maximum amount the defendant will pay to settle the
case is 200. If the fee is deducted from the class's recovery, then the
defendant will offer the class no more than 200; yielding 160 for the
class members and 40 for the class counsel. If, instead, the defendant
pays the fee on top of the class's recovery, the defendant will offer the
class no more than 160; yielding, once again, 160 for the class and 40
for the class counsel. Thus, it makes no difference whether the
defendant formally pays the counsel's fee or the class members pay it
from their recovery; the amount that the class and counsel ultimately
receives will generally be the same in either event.
3. Disposition of case
If the court approves a proposed settlement, the model assumes the
settlement goes into effect and all claims are extinguished. On the
other hand, if there is no classwide settlement, either because the
defendant cannot agree on terms with counsel or the court does not
approve the agreed-upon terms, then the claims must be resolved in
another manner. The claims may be resolved in a class-action trial or
on a claim-by-claim basis, either through individual trials or individual
settlements. No assumptions are made on the alternatives to a
classwide settlement. For our purposes, it makes no difference.
51. Small numbers are used to keep computations simple. The relevant units of measure
might be in thousands or millions of dollars. It makes no difference for present purposes.
52. Counsel would receive 25% of 160, or 40. Adding this number to the 160 the class
received produces a total of 200.
53. In practice, the parties may not know what fee the court will allow, but this is not
relevant for purposes of this analysis. The objective is to understand the optimal fee award
policy. Under the optimal policy, the settling parties will know what fee the court will allow.
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These alternatives simply will be lumped together under the heading
"alternative proceedings."
B. The Court's Objectives
In reviewing a proposed classwide settlement, it is assumed the
court's primary objective is to ensure that the class receives the full
value of its claims. More precisely, the court wants the value of S to
be at least as high as the expected amount the class members would
receive in an "alternative proceeding."54 Note that this analysis is not
concerned with how the settlement amount is distributed among the
class members. The exclusive focus is on the size of the settlement
amount to be distributed.55
Provided that this goal can be satisfied, we assume the court's
second objective is for a class settlement to occur.56 Perhaps the
court wishes to reduce litigation costs, preserve judicial resources, or
quickly compensate the class. The reason is unimportant in the
analysis to follow. Suffice it to say that the court wants to encourage
class settlements provided the court's primary objective is satisfied.
C. Constraints
In pursuing its objectives, the court must act under three basic
constraints. The first constraint is that class counsel acts to maximize
her net return from the case. In particular, it is assumed that in
choosing among a range of possible settlements, the counsel selects
the one that offers her the highest payment. Thus, in settling the
case, counsel seeks to maximize F, the fee she collects. She does not
necessarily act to maximize the value of S, the amount the class
recovers, except to the extent that doing so is congruent with
maximizing F.
The practical consequence of this constraint is that the court cannot
safely rely on the counsel to do what is best for the class.7 Obviously this
assumption only holds up to a point5" The purpose of the assump-
54. This term might reflect the expected value of the claims in different modes of
resolution, weighted by the probability of each mode's occurrence. Thus, if there is no classwide
settlement, the claims may be resolved through individual trials, individual settlements, class
trials, or some combination; w would reflect the probability distribution and expected outcomes
of these different modes of resolution.
55. I consider distributional matters in Part VII below.
56. If this were not the case, then a court simply could never approve any class settlement.
57. The potential divergence in interest between counsel and class is of course the reason
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prohibit settlement of a class action without judicial
approval. See FED. R CIV. P. 23(e) (mandatingjudicial sanction as a matter of law).
58. Ethical or reputational concerns may lead the class counsel to place the class's recovery
above her own.
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tion is to examine the extent to which counsel's incentives diverge
from those of the class members, and the extent to which these
incentives may be aligned. To that end, it is most useful to "assume
the worst" about the counsel's objectives, in the sense that she is out
to maximize her return. 9
The second constraint is that the class members have little or no
control over the counsel's actions and are forced to accept any
settlement the court approves. In particular, it is assumed that many
class members cannot generally "opt out" of, or otherwise veto, a
proposed settlement. The assumption of class passivity seems
reasonable in many cases.' Even if class members are formally given
the right to opt out of a settlement, they often lack the information
necessary to exercise the right when doing so would be in their best
interests.
The practical consequence of this constraint is that the court cannot
safely rely on the class to police the settlement amount. If the class members
were knowledgeable enough to exercise a right to opt out, perhaps
the court would not need to worry about the case settling for too
little, for the class members would not abide by a settlement that gave
them less than opting out would yield. For purposes of analysis, the
class members are unable to protect themselves in this manner.
Third, it is assumed that when the court is called upon to approve
the settlement, it is uncertain about the aggregate value of the class's
claims and possibly the amount the class is actually receiving in
settlement. With regard to the aggregate value of the class's claims,
the court is frequently called upon to approve the settlement of
claims that have not been extensively litigated."1 Because the court
59. This is a widely held premise in analyses of the class action. See Janet Cooper
Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV.
497, 574-76 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in
ShareholderLitigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 26 (1985); Coffee, supra note 16, at 686-89;
Koniak & Cohen, supra note 4, at 1053-57; Kenneth Darn, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation,
Deterrence, and Conflict ofInterest 4J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 57 (1975); Macey & Miller, supra note 16,
at 22; David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the
Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 847, 890 (1984). In Saylorv. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900-01 (2d Cir.
1972),Judge Friendly stated that "the interests of the plaintiff in [a class action] suit and of his
attorney are by no means congruent."
This premise is also the basis for the extensive literature on the economics of attorneys' fees
in ordinary litigation settings. See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 16, at 534-37; Miller, supra
note 27, at 193-95; Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Suzanne Scotchmer, Contingent Fees for Attorneys: An
Economic Analysis, 24 RANDJ. ECON. 343 (1993); Murray L. Schwartz & DanielJ. B. Mitchell, An
Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-Injuy Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1136
(1970).
60. Other authors have argued this at length. See Coffee, supra note 16, at 677-84; Macey
& Miller, supra note 16, at 21.
61. See supra note 32.
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has had little opportunity to gather information in such cases, it is
highly uncertain about the probability of success and the amount of
damages. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the court will
typically be uncertain about the value of the class's claims in alterna-
tive proceedings.
Regarding the court's assessment of the amount the class will
receive in settlement: in many settlement agreements, the defendant
creates a settlement fund from which plaintiffs will be paid. There
may, however, be rigid eligibility requirements preventing many
plaintiffs from collecting from the fund, with the defendant receiving
unclaimed funds.62 The court may have difficulty assessing how
onerous the eligibility requirements will be in practice and thus will
have difficulty ascertaining how much will actually go to the plaintiffs
rather than back to the defendant.
63
The practical consequence of this constraint is that direct regulation
of the settlement amount cannot ensure that the settlement will give the class
the full value of its claims. If the court knew both the value of the
class's claims and the amount the plaintiffs would receive, the court
could simply refuse to approve any settlement that gave the plaintiffs
less than the value of their claims. If, however, the court is uncertain
of the value of the class's claims, or if it has trouble assessing the
amount that will actually be paid in settlement, then regulating the
settlement amount will be prone to error. Sometimes the court will
underestimate the value of the class's claims or overestimate the
amount the class will actually receive, and therefore mistakenly
conclude that the class is receiving the full value of its claims.
III. THE BASIS FOR FEE REGULATION
This Part examines the basis for judicial regulation of the fee class
counsel recovers. To accomplish this objective, the preceeding
hypothetical situation will proceed under the assumption that the
court will not regulate the fee. Therefore, assume that in deciding
whether to approve a proposed classwide settlement, the court only
scrutinizes the size of S, the settlement amount paid to the class, and
pays no attention to the size of F, the amount paid to the class
counsel.
62. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1418.
63. See id at 1377. Settlements consisting of nonmonetary relief also pose difficulties in
assessing the settlement's value. SeeNote, In-Kind Class Action Settlements, 109 HARv. L REV. 810,
827 n.81 (1996).
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A. Equilibrium Settlements
Let us begin by examining the properties of the settlements that
will be reached if the court does not regulate the counsel's fee. The
central result can be summarized as follows: if the court does not
regulate the fee, class counsel and the defendant have an incentive to settle the
case on terms that give the class members the minimum allowable amount.
The "minimum allowable amount" is the smallest value of S that the
court is willing to approve.'
The essential intuition underlying this assertion is simple. 5 From
the standpoint of the negotiating parties (the defendant and class
counsel), paying the class any increment above the minimum
allowable settlement amount is wasteful, in that the negotiating parties
would be better off dividing that increment between themselves.66
For this reason, any settlement involving a payment of more than the
minimum allowable amount is inferior, from the standpoint of the
settling parties, to a settlement involving the payment of the mini-
mum allowable settlement amount. Accordingly, if the settling parties
seek to maximize their own welfare, they will not agree to give the
class more than the minimum allowable settlement amount.
Suppose, for example, that in a given case the minimum allowable
settlement amount is 100.67 Consider a settlement agreement that
gives the class more than this amount: the class will receive 110, and




Now suppose the settling parties consider a new agreement that would
divide the excess amount paid to the class, 10, between themselves on




64. For the sake of clarity, it is assumed that settling parties know this amount.
65. For formal proof, see infra Appendix.
66. Several authors have argued a similar point. See POSNER, supra note 31, at 570; Macey
& Miller, supra note 16, at 25-26.
67. See supra note 51 (discussing relevant units of measure).
68. Thus, in this agreement, S = 110, and F= 20.
69. Thus, in this new agreement, S = 100, while F= 25.
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The latter arrangement makes both settling parties better off than
does the former. In effect, each has made money at the expense of
the class. By this reasoning, it is clear that an agreement in which the
surplus is divided between the settling parties improves, from the
perspective of the settling parties, any settlement agreement in which
the class receives some surplus above 10.
This result is obtained whether or not the court selects class counsel
in advance. This point may not have been sufficiently appreciated in
the past. Intuition suggests that pre-settlement selection of the class
counsel is likely to lead to a more generous settlement recovery for
the class. This result underlies criticism of the "settlement class
action" device."0 Yet this intuition is mistaken, at least if there is no
regulation of the counsel's fee. 1 Absent regulation of the counsel's
fee, the counsel, together with the defendant, rationally will choose
to settle the case for the minimum allowable amount. Regardless of
whether the court pre-selected the counsel, she has no economic
incentive to agree to a settlement giving the class more than that
amount.
Therefore, what difference does it make whether counsel is selected
in advance of the settlement negotiation? The only effect is on the
fee paid to the counsel herself."2 If counsel is chosen in advance,
the defendant faces a monopolist; the defendant cannot settle the
case except by reaching agreement with that counsel. Accordingly,
the defendant must pay that counsel at least as much as counsel
would receive if there were no class settlement. In contrast, if the
counsel is not selected in advance, the defendant can "shop around"
for the lawyer who stands to gain the least if there is no class
settlement, and settle with her.7
70. This criticism is founded on the proposition that such pre-settlement selection prevents
the defendant from "shopping around" for the most compliant class member, or lawyer, in order
to secure the lowest possible settlement. As a result, the class benefits in settlement if the class
counsel is designated in advance. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1453-57.
71. As will be demonstrated, if there is prdper regulation of the counsel's fee, advance
selection of the class counsel makes no difference.
72. For mathematical proof of this point, see infra Appendix.
73. These points can be illustrated with a variant of the earlier numerical example. Assume
the defendant's expected loss in alternative proceedings is 200, and the minimum value of S the
court will approve is 100. In addition, there is a set of candidates for class counsel. Within that
set, some candidates will recover 10 in alternative proceedings, while others will recover 20. The
disparity might represent differences in the quality of individual claims, or alternatively,
differences in the size of the candidates' claim portfolios.
Assume the court does not choose the counsel in advance. The defendant will then settle
with one of the candidates who stands to recover 10, and the amount paid to the counsel (P)
will be 10. If any candidate demands more than 10, another candidate who is willing to take
an amount closer to 10 will underbid her. Through this competitive process, the value of Fwill
be bid down to 10.
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B. Justification for Regulating the Fee
Without fee regulation, then, class counsel has an incentive to settle
the case for the minimum value of S that the court will permit.74 If
that is the amount the settling parties settle for, does it follow that the
class members collect too little?
That conclusion would not follow if the court knew the value of the
class's claims. In such a situation, as discussed previously, the court
could simply refuse to approve any settlement giving the class less
than that amount.75 If the court is uncertain about the value of the
class's claims, however, then one may expect the class members
systematically to collect less than that amount. This is true for two
reasons: (1) biased estimations; and (2) adverse selection.
First, the minimum allowable settlement amount is
disproportionately likely to lie below the value of the class members'
claims. The defendant and class counsel have a joint incentive to
minimize the court's estimate of the value of the class's claims and to
maximize the court's assessment of the amount being paid to the
class.76 Consider, for example, the court's estimate of the value of
the class's claims. The lower the court's estimate of the claim, the less
that the defendant must pay to the class members. A low -estimate
leaves more for the defendant and class counsel to split between
themselves. To the extent that the settling parties can influence the
court's beliefs, one would expect a bias in the court's estimate of the
value of the class's claims, with the court more often than not
underestimating the value of the class's claims.7 7 For similar reasons,
one would expect the court to overestimate the amount that actually
will be paid under a given settlement. If so, then the minimum
Now suppose that the court chooses a counsel in advance. This situation differs in potentially
two respects from the one just described. First, it may raise the bottom of the settlement range;
if the court selects one of the candidates who stands to recover 20 in the event no class
settlement occurs, then obviously the value of F will not be less than 20. Second, and
independent from the first point, it raises the top of the settlement range. Because the
defendant cannot seek competing bids, the class counsel may be able to hold out for a fee of
100. The defendant is willing to pay up to 200 to settle the case. The class must receive 100
of the settlement, with 100 remaining for the class counsel.
74. Counsel may, for reasons of principle or other factors, refuse to act on this incentive.
The critical point for present purposes is that the incentive exists.
75. See supra Figure 1 and accompanying text.
76. As noted above, it may be difficult for the court to ascertain the value of the relief
offered to the class. See supra Part H.C.
77. The court, knowing of this incentive, presumably will discount to some extent the
settling parties' statements regarding its value. Nonetheless, in an adversary system, the court
has few sources of information regarding the case other than the parties themselves. It is fair
to assume that in many cases the settling parties can, through practices such as the selective
presentation of information, induce the court to underestimate the value of the class's claims.
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settlement that the court permits will tend to be less than the value
of the class's claims.
Second, class settlements will be drawn disproportionately from the
set of cases in which the minimum allowable settlement amount is less
than the value of the class's claims. The reasoning here is simple: If
the minimum allowable settlement amount is significantly greater
than the value of the class's claims, the defendant rationally will
choose not to settle because he or she does better by foregoing a class
settlement and paying the value of the class's claims in alternative
proceedings. By contrast, whenever the minimum allowable settle-
ment amount is less than the value of the class's claims, the defendant
(and counsel) will be happy to settle. The upshot is that, roughly
speaking, when the court overestimates the value of the class's claims,
the class collects the value of its claims because there is no class
settlement."8 When the court underestimates the value of the class's
claims, however, the class collects less than that value because there
is a class settlement. As a result, at least on average, the class collects
less than the value of its claims. This should occur even if there is no
bias in judicial estimations of the value of the class's claims.7 9
IV. EFFECTS OF FEE REGULATION
A. Capping Counsel's Fee
In a world without fee regulation, there is an inverse relation
between the amount collected in settlement by the class and the
amount collected by counsel. That is the lesson of the analysis in Part
III: Every dollar that is not given to the class can be split between
counsel and the defendant." Counsel thus shares the defendant's
incentive to minimize the amount paid to the class members. This is
the principal rationale for having courts scrutinize and regulate the
terms of the fee paid to the class counsel in class settlements.
One option for the court is to regulate the fee so as to link
counsel's recovery to the attorney's performance on the class's behalf.
More specifically, the court could limit counsel's fee to a specified
78. To be sure, litigation costs and risk aversion may lead the defendant to settle even when
the minimum allowable settlement amount is greater than the value of the class's claims.
Nonetheless, if the minimum allowable settlement is above a ceiling amount, the defendant will
not settle. There is, however, no corresponding floor on the minimum allowable settlement
below which the counsel will not settle. Even if the minimum allowable value of S is zero, the
settling parties will be happy to settle.
79. A similar analysis applies to errors in judicial assessments of the amount being paid to
the class.
80. See supra Part IMI.B.
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fraction (or multiple) of the class recovery. Under this form of fee
regulation, the court allows counsel to collect only some fixed
percentage-termed the fee percentage--,of the amount paid to the
class. Expressed symbolically, the court declares that counsel's fee
must satisfy the following expression:
F _ cDS,
where
= the fee cap, that is, the maximum percentage of the
class's recovery that counsel is allowed to collect as
his or her fee.
Thus, for example, if D = .25, counsel's fee cannot exceed one-fourth
of the amount actually paid to the class members. In other words,
the class members must receive at least four times as much as the
counsel herself."1
It is important to emphasize that for a fee cap to function effective-
ly, the court must not permit counsel to collect any other compensa-
tion in the case or any other payment from the defendant. Class
counsel may have contracts with some of the class members entitling
the attorney to some share of the class member's recovery.8 2 Class
counsel must surrender these rights under the contracts as a
condition for becoming class counsel; if counsel does not, then the
fee cap will not work. In addition, counsel must not receive money
from the defendant on other cases apart from the class action. Under
current practice, class counsel may sometimes concurrently represent
(1) the class and (2) other clients, excluded from the class, with
claims against the defendant. An obvious temptation for the settling
parties is to enter an agreement in which the latter claims are settled
on relatively advantageous terms, while the class's claims are settled
for a relatively small amount.8" For the fee cap to work, this arrange-
ment must be prohibited.
Percentage-based fees are widely employed by courts in class
actions.8 4 Courts have not, however, examined the problem of
determining what fee cap is needed to ensure that the class receives
81. In addition, the court-to counteract any problem in assessing the true size of the
settlement-can specify that counsel collect only as money is actually paid to the class members.
82. See Resnik et al., supra note 46, at 338; see also Coffee, supra note 2, at 1375.
83. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1373-74 (discussing role of attorney representation in
inventing settlement collusion context).
84. See Miller, supra note 12, at 23.
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the full value of its claims in settlement.' Such is the task in the
following analysis. To lay the foundation for that analysis, one must
consider the relations between the choice of a cap, the selection of a
counsel, and the outcome of the settlement process.
B. The Fee Cap's Effects on Settlement Behavior
How does introduction of a fee cap affect the equilibrium outcome
of settlement negotiations? Its central effect is to induce counsel to
demand more for the class than she would if the fee was unregulated.
By tying counsel's recovery to that of the class, the fee cap eliminates
the inverse relation (that obtains when the fee is unregulated)
between the amount paid to the class and the amount that class
counsel is paid. This much is obvious and is a well-recognized
principle in other settings.8 6
What is perhaps less obvious is that this effect becomes more
pronounced as the fee cap is lowered. More precisely, the smaller the
fraction of the class's recovery that counsel is permitted to collect, the
more counsel will demand in settlement on behalf of the class if all
else is equal.87 To see this point, recall that counsel will not agree
to any settlement that gives the attorney less than the amount that she
would receive if the parties did not agree to settle.' If the fee cap
is very low, then S must be relatively large in order to induce counsel
to accept the settlement. In this way, setting a relatively low fee cap
counteracts counsel's incentive to settle for the minimum allowable
settlement amount.
89
The net impact on the settlement behavior of the parties can be
summarized as follows: The lower the fee cap, (1) the lower the likelihood
of a class settlement; and (2) the greater the amount collected by the class
members in the event of settlement.9" These crosscutting effects arise
85. See Resnick et al., supra note 46, at 339-45.
86. The virtues of tying the agent's recovery or profit to that of the principal is familiar not
only in lawyer-dient settings but all principal-agent arrangements. SeePAUL R. MILGROM &JOHN
ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 214-16 (1992).
87. One qualification here is that this point may hold if the parties are asymmetrically
informed about the value of the class's claims. See infra Part VI.
88. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
89. Consider the following numerical example. Suppose that, if counsel does not settle with
the defendant, then the attorney expects to earn 20; and suppose that the minimum allowable
settlement amount is 100. If (D is less than 20%, then counsel will not agree to a settlement that
fails to give more than 100 to the class; counsel will not agree to a settlement in which F< 20.
A settlement giving the counsel that much will be allowed by the fee cap only if (DS >_20. If 4D
is less than 20%, the only values of S satisfying that inequality are greater than 100. Thus,
choosing a fee cap below 20% ensures that if the case settles, the settlement amount is greater
than the minimum allowable settlement amount.
90. Conversely, raising the fee cap has the opposite effects.
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from the fact that lowering the cap has the effect of increasing
counsel's minimum demand in settlement. The more that counsel
insists on recovering in settlement, the less appealing settlement will
be in the defendant's eyes. If counsel's demands get large enough,
the defendant will simply forego a class settlement entirely. If a settle-
ment is reached, however, then the class will take away more than it
otherwise would have, precisely because counsel has held out for a
relatively large settlement.
TABLE 1
Numerical Example: Effects of Adjusting the Fee Cap
Minimum value Maximum value Width of
of S acceptable of S acceptable settlement
Fee cap to counsel to defendant range
33% 60 150 90
25% 100 160 60
15% 133 173 40
10% 200 181 -
Note. - Counsel's expected gain in the event he does not settle is 20. The defendant's
expected loss in the event it does not settle with the counsel is 200. See footnotes 91 and 93
for an explanation of how each column is calculated.
Table 1 provides a numerical example of these crosscutting effects.
Suppose again that counsel expects to earn 20 if he or she does not
settle with the defendant. Assume, in addition, that the defendant
expects to lose a total of 200 if it does not settle with counsel. Table
1 indicates the parties' bargaining positions under four arbitrarily
chosen fee caps.9 As the Table indicates, the bottom of the
settlement range-counsel's minimum demand-rises as the fee cap
falls.92  By contrast, however, the width of the settlement
range"-the set of mutually acceptable settlement amounts-
contracts as the fee cap falls.94 Observe that if the cap is set at 10%,
there is no mutually acceptable settlement amount.95 If we assume
91. Counsel will reject any settlement unless (DS2 20. Rearranging terms, we see that the
minimum value of S acceptable to the counsel is given by 20/(; this figure is indicated in the
second column of Table 1. The defendant will reject any settlement unless S + cDS 200.
Again, rearranging terms, we find that the maximum value of S acceptable to the defendant is
given by 200/(1--'1); this figure is listed in the third column of Table 1.
92. See Table 1.
93. That is, the width of the settlement range is the extent to which the maximum amount
the defendant is willing to pay exceeds the minimum amount the counsel is willing to accept.
This figure is obtained by subtracting the second column in Table I from the third column.
94. See Table 1.
95. See id.
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the court is uncertain about what the parties stand to gain or lose
from alternative proceedings, then it follows that lowering the fee cap
has the effect of reducing the likelihood that the settlement range is
of positive width."6 This reduces the probability that settlement will
be feasible.
The implication of this result is that the court faces a trade-off in
regulating counsel's fee. If the fee cap is set too high, the case will
settle but the class members will recover too little in the settlement.
If the fee cap is set too low, however, then there will be no class
settlement at all. Finding the right fee cap forces the court to balance
these risks. 7
C. Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Effects of the Fee Cap
The effects just described bear on the size and likelihood of the
settlement negotiated by class counsel. These are so-called ex ante
effects, in that class counsel bases her settlement demands on the fee
cap that she anticipates will later be applied.9" Another effect of the
fee cap, of course, is that it determines how the settlement proceeds
are actually divided between the class members and class counsel.
This distributional impact is an ex post effect, in that it arises after the
settlement has occurred. It is important to distinguish these ex ante
and ex post effects. In particular, it is crucial to see that the fee cap
affects how a settlement is divided between class members and class
counsel, as well as the size of the settlement itself
It would be a mistake for a court, in setting the fee cap, to focus
exclusively on the distributive consequences of a given cap, while
ignoring its incentive properties. The reason is simple: A fee cap
that seems perfectly reasonable in terms of its ex post distributive
qualities may nonetheless have disastrous ex ante incentive effects.
This point will emerge with greater clarity later, after we have
analyzed the structure of the optimal fee cap.9" For now it suffices
to illustrate the point with the above numerical example.
96. Counsel's minimum demand must be less than the defendant's maximum offer for the
parties to reach a settlement. The lower the value of 0, the closer these two figures will
be-meaning that there is less "margin for error" in the event the court is wrong about what the
parties stand to gain or lose from alternative proceedings. Given the uncertainty of the court's
perspective, the lower the value of 0, the less likely that this precondition for settlement will
hold.
97. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
98. See infra Part V.C; see also POsNER, supra note 31, at 570.
99. See infra Part V and Appendix Part D.
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Returning to the example in Table 1, assume that the value of the
class's claims in alternative proceedings is 180.1' Suppose that the
court sets the fee cap at 33% of the class members' recovery."' In
purely distributional terms, this may seem an entirely appropriate
share to give class counsel. It approximates the share generally given
by courts to class counsel, and indeed is smaller than the share taken
by the lawyer in private fee arrangements. 02 Yet permitting class
counsel to take that percentage encourages the attorney to settle for
much less than the class's claims are worth. 03 To prevent class
counsel from settling for less than the value of the class's claims, the
fee cap must be significantly less than this seemingly-reasonable
figure." In this sense, the optimal fee cap, judged ex ante, may
differ substantially from what may seem reasonable in ex post
terms.
10 5
V. THE OPTIMAL FE CAP
The focus of the analysis now becomes choosing the optimal fee
cap, viewed ex ante. The optimal fee cap is defined as follows:
(D* = the value of (D that induces class counsel to
demand the settlement that provides the class
members with the value of their claims.
More precisely, (D* is the fee ceiling that brings counsel's minimum
demand as close as possible to, but not below, the value of the class members'
claims.
100. This is not inconsistent with our earlier assumption that the defendant's expected loss
from an alternative proceeding is 200. In addition to the 180 owed (in expected terms) to the
class, the defendant can be assumed to face litigation costs of 20 if it does not settle.
101. This is the same as decreeing that class counsel collect one-fourth of the total amount
paid by the defendant to settle the case. If the class receives three-fourths, and class counsel
one-fourth of the amount paid by the defendant, then counsel's fee is equal to 33% of what the
class members collect.
102. Several studies have shown that fee awards in class action settlements tend to give class
counsel between 20% and 30% of total amount recovered from the defendant, or, equivalently,
between 25% and 42% of the net amount paid io the class. See I CONTE, supra note 12, at 50.
Contingent fees in personal injury litigation generally run in the same range. See Bruce L. Hay,
Contingent Fees and Agency Costs, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 525-27 (1996); Bruce L. Hay, Optimal
Contingent Fees in a World of Settlement, 26J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 299-300 (1997) (citing studies).
103. Counsel is willing to agree to a settlement giving the class members 60, which is only
one-third of the value of their claims. See supra Table 1.
104. More precisely, it must lie between 10% and 15% of the amount taken by the class
members.
105. See Hay, supra note 18, at 482.
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The value of (D* represents a solution to the trade-off problem
facing the court."06 The court wants to set (D sufficiently low to
ensure that counsel will not enter into a settlement that gives the class
members less than the value of their claims. The court, however,
does not want to set (D so low as to prevent the case from settling at
all. In essence, cD* is the highest cap that the court can impose while
still ensuring that the attorney will not settle for less than the value of
the class's claims.
A. Basic Structure of the Optimal Fee Cap
What is the optimal fee cap for a given counsel? For clarity of
exposition, the analysis will proceed under three assumptions. It is
assumed: (1) that negotiating a classwide settlement and going to
alternative proceedings are equally costly (in terms of time and
expense) to class counsel; (2) that class counsel does not systematical-
ly underestimate or overestimate the value of the case; and (3) that
class counsel is risk-neutral. After analyzing the optimal fee cap under
these conditions," we will consider the significance of relaxing
these assumptions.
If counsel is designated in advance of settlement bargaining, then
the optimal fee cap for the attorney acting as class counsel is given by
the following fraction:
Attorney's expected recovery in
alternative proceedings
Class members' expected recovery in
alternative proceedings
The reasoning behind this solution is simple. The minimum
amount that counsel will settle for is an amount that provides the
value of what the attorney expects to receive in alternative proceed-
ings. If the fee cap is set at the above fraction, then he or she will
not settle for an amount less than the aggregate expected recovery in
alternative proceedings. That leaves the class members with an
amount (at least) equal to the aggregate expected recovery minus
counsel's expected recovery.
106. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
107. See infra Appendix Part D.
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The above numerical example illustrates the point. Suppose that
the class's expected recovery in alternative proceedings is 180, and
counsel's expected recovery is 20. If the fee cap is set at 11% (that
is, the fraction 20/180), then the minimum settlement to which
counsel will agree is one where 180 is paid to the class."' 8 Thus, in
this example, the optimal fee cap is D* = 11%. A fee cap any higher
might lead to a settlement below 180.
Matters are more complicated when counsel is not designated in
advance. The complicating factor is that a candidate's minimum
settlement demand depends not only on what she expects to earn if
the case does not settle, but also on what she expects to receive if the
defendant settles with a different candidate. If counsel is not designat-
ed in advance, then the optimal fee cap for class counsel is demon-
strated by either the previous fraction or the following fraction,
whichever is less:
Attorney's expected recovery in a
settlement negotiated by another candidate
Class members' expected recovery in a
settlement negotiated by another candidate
If there is more than one possible candidate, the optimal cap is the
one for which the above fraction is smallest. This explains why the
court must compare the two fractions in the proposition.
The central insight behind this result is that if the fee cap is larger
than the second fraction, then being class counsel is advantageous to
a candidate-that is, a given settlement provides more to class counsel
than to other candidates. If being class counsel is advantageous in
this way, then candidates will seek to underbid each other in the
settlement offers they make to the defendant. The court accordingly
must set the fee cap lower than both of the above fractions to ensure
that the class does not collect less than the value of its claims.
Let me illustrate this with a variant of the above numerical
example. Consider some candidate X who expects to get 20 in
alternative proceedings if there is no class settlement. Assume the
defendant can settle with either X or some other candidate Y
108. From the previous footnote, we know that counsel will not agree to a settlement unless
S > 20/0. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. Plugging 1 = 0.11 into this expression
yields S > 180.
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Suppose that X expects the court to set (D equal to 11% if she is
counsel; but suppose that, if Yis counsel, X expects to receive some
smaller fraction-say, 6%-of the settlement. It is easy to see that X
may be willing to settle for less than the value of the class's claims.
Suppose Yoffers the defendant a settlement in which S = 180. Rather
than allow that deal to be made, X is better off attempting to settle
for a lower amount.'" Furthermore, if Y is in the same predica-
ment as X11° then the candidates will bid their way down to the
minimum allowable settlement amount. 1 '
The only way for the court to prevent this cycle of downward
bidding is to eliminate the pecuniary advantage enjoyed by the
candidate who becomes class counsel. To do this, the court should
make (D no greater than the latter fraction above. A given candidate's
fractional share of a settlement that she herself enters into must be no
greater than counsel's fractional share of a settlement that a rival
candidate enters into. Thus, in the above numerical example, it follows
that X should get only 6% of any settlement that she enters into,
because Xwould get only 6% of a settlement entered into by Y More
generally, if the latter fraction is smaller than the former, then (D
should be set equal to the latter fraction.
If, however, the latter fraction is larger than the former, then the
court should set (D equal to the former fraction. Interestingly, in this
scenario the optimal fee cap encourages candidates to avoid being
counsel, because a given settlement most handsomely rewards those
who are not class counsel."' Each candidate will be tempted to
overbid the other, so as to maneuver the other into being class
counsel. Nonetheless, the optimal fee cap is equal to the former
fraction; for if the fee cap is higher than that, the case may settle for
less than the value of the class's claims.
B. Properties of the Optimal Fee Cap
The optimal fee cap has been defined with the primary objective of
assuring that the class members receive at least the value of their
claims in the event the case settles. A secondary objective is to
109. If Ys offer is accepted, Xgets 6% of the resulting settlement; if Xoffers a slightly lower
settlement amount-175, for example-that is accepted, then X gets 11% of the resulting
settlement.
110. That is, if the fraction Yreceives from a settlement negotiated by Xis smaller than the
fraction receives from a settlement that she herself negotiates.
111. Should Yoffer more than that amount, Xwill have an incentive to underbid Y, and vice
versa.
112. For example, suppose that for X the latter fraction is 15% while the former remains
11%. Rather than settle for a given amount, Xwould prefer to see Ysettle for that amount.
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enable, to the extent possible, the case to settle on a classwide basis.
The question naturally arises: To what extent are these objectives
complementary? Put otherwise, is a classwide settlement feasible
under the optimal fee cap? As this Article has shown, settlement is
feasible if the defendant's maximum offer-the most he is willing to
pay-exceeds the counsel's minimum demand."1
Analysis of the parties' bargaining positions under the optimal fee
cap yields the following result: When the court employs an optimalfee cap,
settlement is always feasible if the counsel is designated in advance; but it may
be infeasible if the counsel is not designated in advance. If counsel is
selected in advance, the defendant's maximum offer always exceeds
counsel's minimum demand when the court employs the optimal fee
cap. This is not necessarily true, however, if counsel is not designated
in advance. If the court employs the optimal fee cap, there may be
no candidate whose minimum demand is less than the defendant's
maximum offer.
The intuition behind this result is quite straightforward. When
counsel is designated in advance under the optimal fee cap, the
minimum settlement amount that counsel will accept is one that gives
the class members the value of their claims and provides counsel with
her expected profit from alternative proceedings. That settlement
amount is, by definition, less than the total amount the defendant
expects to lose if there is no class settlement. So long as the parties
expect the court to employ the optimal fee cap, settlement will be
feasible.
Matters are more difficult when counsel is not designated in
advance. The fee cap may have to be much lower than would be
appropriate if counsel were designated in advance. The reason for
setting such a low fee cap, once again, is to prevent a downward spiral
of bidding among the candidates. The result of setting the fee cap
so low, however, is that the minimum settlement that any candidate will
accept exceeds the maximum settlement that the defendant is willing to
pay.
114
Thus, in cases where class counsel is not designated in advance, the
two identified objectives of fee regulation are not necessarily
compatible. In particular, this quandary arises when candidate Xgets
only a relatively small fraction of any settlement negotiated by some
other candidate Y If that fraction is sufficiently low, there is no fee
113. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
114. The earlier numerical example, where the optimal fee cap was found to be 1/17,
illustrates this point. As we know from Table 1, settlement is infeasible when the fee cap is this
low.
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cap that can both make settlement feasible and ensure that the class
members get at least the value of their claims. In such cases, using
the optimal fee cap-as defined in this Article-prevents a class
settlement altogether."5
C. Refinements to the Basic Structure
One must now consider the consequences of relaxing the assump-
tions employed in describing the basic structure of the optimal
cap." 6 Table 2 summarizes the results.
TABLE 2
Effects of Different Factors on the Optimal Fee Cap
Effect on the
Factor Optimal Fee Cap
Relative cost to the attorney of alternate proceedings
Attorney optimism toward alternate proceedings +
Attorney risk aversion
Note. - "+" means that the factor is positively correlated with the fee cap, so that increasing
(decreasing) the factor has the effect of raising (lowering) the optimal fee cap; "--" means
that the factor is negatively correlated with the optimal fee cap, so that increasing (decreas-
ing) the factor lowers (raises) the optimal fee cap.
(a) Litigation Costs. Sometimes alternative proceedings will be more
costly to counsel than negotiating a classwide settlement" 7 In
other situations, alternative proceedings will be less costly than
negotiating a classwide settlement"" How does this affect the
analysis? If alternative proceedings are more costly than negotiating
a classwide settlement, then the optimal fee cap will generally be
lower than it is in the basic analysis above." 9 All else being equal,
the greater the costs counsel must bear in the alternative proceedings,
the less profitable those proceedings will be for the attorney-and
115. A corollary is that if such cases settle on a classwide basis, the parties do not expect the
court to use the optimal fee cap. Then there are no assurances that the class members are
receiving the value of their claims.
116. See Appendix Parts D-E.
117. This is true, for example, when the alternative proceedings consist of a class trial led
by the counsel negotiating the settlement. SeeDaniel R Walteher, ClasszddeArbitration and 10b-5
Claims in the Wake of Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 74 COPNELL L. REV. 380,
395 (1989).
118. This may be true in the context of a settlement class action. For a given lawyer who
represents a small number of clients, the alternative to negotiating a classwide settlement is
simply to settle the cases of her clients. That process may be significantly less costly than
negotiating a classwide settlement.
119. In addition, the more costly alternative proceedings are relative to negotiating a class
settlement, the lower the optimal fee cap will be.
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counsel will settle the case for less. To counteract this effect, the fee
cap must be lowered to boost counsel's minimum settlement demand
to the appropriate level.
Conversely, if alternative proceedings are less costly than negotiat-
ing a classwide settlement, then the optimal fee cap will be higher
than it is in the basic analysis above. The greater the costs of settling,
the more tempting it will be to go to alternative proceedings if all else
is equal. Accordingly, counsel will make a very high settlement
demand, perhaps thereby preventing settlement. To counteract this
effect, the fee cap must be raised to lower the attorney's minimum
settlement demand to the right level, thereby making settlement
feasible.
(b) Information. Perhaps counsel will systematically underestimate
or overestimate the value of the class's claims. 2 ' How do these
possibilities affect the optimal fee cap? If counsel underestimates the
value of the case, then she obviously will tend to demand too little in
settlement. This effect may be counteracted by lowering the fee cap.
If, however, counsel overestimates the value of the case, then she will
tend to demand too much in settlement. This effect may be counter-
acted by raising the fee cap.
(c) Risk Aversion. Finally, one must consider the class counsel's
aversion to risk."' Analytically, risk aversion is analogous to increas-
ing the relative litigation cost of the riskier (less certain) course of
action available to the attorney. Accordingly, the above analysis of
litigation costs applies to risk aversion.12 Assuming that the out-
come of alternative proceedings is riskier or less predictable than
negotiating a class settlement, then the presence of attorney risk
aversion implies that the optimal fee cap is lower than it would be
otherwise.
12-
120. In matters where the defendant has private information, there arguably is a bias toward
systematic underestimation of the case's value by counsel. The argument is roughly as follows.
If counsel overestimates the value of the case, then the defendant will correct the counsel's
belief. If, however, counsel underestimates the value of the claims, then the defendant will not
correct the counsel's estimate, because such an error dearly benefits the defendant. Even
though discovery rules apply, one assumes that the defendant cannot be more or less
forthcoming in the discovery process. Favorable information might be buried -in a pile of
documents, while unfavorable information might be placed in a brightly colored folder.
Research in cognitive psychology, however, suggests that litigants systematically tend to
overestimate the value of their case. See Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in
Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REv. 1337 (1995).
121. The presence of such risk aversion depends, roughly speaking, on the extent to which
the attorney's fortune is bound up with the case (or, equivalently, how large a stake counsel has
in the outcome of the case). In general, the larger the attorney's stake in the case, the more
reluctant counsel will be to gamble.
122. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
123. Likewise, the more risk averse the attorney is, the lower the fee cap.
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The preceding factors may drive the optimal fee cap below or above
the point prescribed by the basic structure derived earlier. In
combination, these factors may push in opposite directions and may
cancel each other out to some extent. 24  There is no reason,
however, to suppose that these factors will offset completely. Accord-
ingly, the basic structure of the optimal fee cap can only be regarded
as an approximation of the actual optimal fee cap. The approxima-
tion is useful nonetheless, as it at least provides us with a sense of the
order of magnitude of the optimal fee cap. As the subsequent
analysis will show, that order of magnitude may be smaller than is
generally suspected.
VI. IDENTIMNG THE OPTIMAL FEE CAP
Having examined the abstract structure of the optimal fee cap, the
analysis now turns to the issue of identifying the optimal fee cap in a
particular case.
A. The information problem
The basic structure of the optimal fee cap reveals what approximate
fraction of the settlement class counsel should recover to induce the
attorney to settle for the right amount. The obvious pr6blem this
raises is how the court can acquire the information needed to
evaluate that fraction in a given case. In particular, the question
arises: To evaluate the fractions defined above, does the court need
to know the value of the expected recovery in a given case?
If the answer to that question is yes, then the derivation of the
optimal fee cap is useless, for it assumes away the very problem that
it is supposed to address. After all, if the court knew the expected
recovery in a particular case, it could directly infer the value of the
class's claims." Then, the court would no longer need the indirect
method of fee regulation to ensure that the class members receive the
value of their claims because it could simply refuse to approve any
settlement that gave the class members less than the expected
recovery. The premise of the fee regnlation analysis is that the court
does not know the value of the terms in the fractions.
124. For example, these factors might push in opposite directions if alternative proceedings
would be less costly, but more risky, for class counsel This might be true in settlement class
action settings, where an attorney might take on a much larger client base in negotiating a
classwide settlement than she would have in alternate proceedings. The lower costs push the
fee cap up, while risk aversion pushes it down.
125. Recall that the value of the class members' claims is given by (Aggregate ixpected iryovey
in alterative proceedings) - (Counsel's expected recoveiy in altemnative proceedings). See supra Part VIA
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The issue that must be investigated, therefore, is the extent to
which the court can evaluate the fractions in Part V.A without
knowing the value of the terms in the fractions. One possibility is
that these fractions are independent of the expected recovery in the
case. If so, the court may be able to estimate the optimal fee ceiling
without knowing the expected recovery.
B. An Approach to the Problem
Central to the following analysis is the standard contingent fee,
which gives the lawyer a fixed fraction of the recovery. This arrange-
ment frequently governs counsel's recovery in the event she does not
negotiate a class settlement. Its fixed quality-the fact that the
lawyer's cap is to some extent independent of the size of the
recovery-may enable the court to assess the optimal fee cap, even if
it does not know the expected recovery in the case.
To illustrate the point, it may be helpful to begin with an example
outside the class action context. Assume a lawyer represents a client
under a contingent fee arrangement that gives the lawyer one-third
of the total recovery in the case. Disregarding litigation costs, we
know that the ratio between the lawyer's expected recovery and the
class members' recovery is one-half.2 To determine this ratio, the
court need not know anything about the size of the expected recovery
in the case; the fee arrangement provides the pertinent information.
One can use this reasoning to assess the fractions in Part V.A.
If counsel is designated in advance, the optimal fee cap is estimated
by the following product:
Counsel's share of the claims x Fee-compensation ration
in alternative proceedings in alternative proceedings
The multiplicand refers to the value of the attorney's fractional share
of the overall set of claims in the class if the case had gone to alternative
proceedings. It is the proportion of claims counsel would handle if
there were no class settlements in settlement negotiations.127 The
multiplier represents the ratio between what the attorney would get
and what the client would receive in each claim the counsel handles,
provided there were no class settlement.
28
126. The lawyer receives one-third of the recovery, and the class gets the remaining two-
thirds. This creates a ratio of one-half.
127. Thus, for example, if counsel's clients' claims represent 1/100 of the value of the all
claims in the class, then the attorney's share of the cases is 1/100.
128. If these figures vary among clients, then the court must use an average figure.
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To see that the above expression yields the optimal fee cap,
consider the following numerical example. Suppose an attorney's
share of the claims is one-tenth, and the ratio of this fee to the
client's net recovery is one-third."2  Assume further the class
members would receive some amount Win alternative proceedings.
The attorney will not settle the case on terms that provide less than
she expects to receive in alternative proceedings, which is W/30. If
the court sets her fee cap at 1/30, then counsel will not settle for less
than W. As a result, the class members will receive at least W in
settlement-which is what they would have been awarded, in expected
terms, in alternative proceedings.
If the counsel is not designated in advance, the optimal fee cap is
approximated by either the above expression or the following
product, whichever is smaller:
Counsel's share of the claims x Fee-compensation ratio
in another's settlement in another's settlement
The multiplicand refers to what the attorney's fractional share of the
overall set of claims in the class would have been, if another attorney
had negotiated a classwide settlement. That is, it is the proportion of
claims counsel would handle if another attorney had represented the
class in settlement negotiations. The multiplier represents the ratio
between what the attorney would get and what the client would
receive, in each claim that counsel would have handled, if another
attorney had negotiated a class settlement."3
C. The Court's Informational Task
The foregoing analysis furnishes the court a means for assessing the
optimal fee cap in a particular case without necessarily estimating the
expected recovery in the case. The question then becomes whether
a court can determine the value of the terms defined in Part VI.B
without knowing the expected recovery in a case.
Suppose the attorney has been retained by fifty of the class
members. The court wants to know what fraction these claims
constitute relative to the overall set of claims. To estimate this
fraction, the court needs two pieces of information. First, it needs to
129. This would be the case if counsel had a 25% contingent fee. Under such an
arrangement, the lawyer receives one-fourth of the recovery, leaving three-fourths for the client;
the ratio is accordingly one-third.
130. This may or may not be identical to the fee-compensation ratio in alternative
proceedings.
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know how many claims there are, or how many members constitute
the class. Second, the court needs to know the extent to which the
claims of the attorney's clients resemble those of other class members.
Suppose, for example, that there are a total of 5,000 class members.
If the attorney's clients possess claims that are indistinguishable from
those of the remaining class members, then the attorney's share of
the total claims amounts to 50/5000, or 1/100. If counsel's clients'
possess claims that are stronger than average for the class, however,
then the attorney's share exceeds 1/100; the expected recoveries of
these clients are greater than 1/100 of the class's total expected
recovery. Similarly, if the claims of these clients are weaker than
average, then the attorney's share of the total claims is less than
1/100.
Both of these pieces of information may be difficult to ascertain.
Consider, for instance, a class action involving claims for future
injuries. The court may possess only a rough idea of how many
claimants will appear.1' Furthermore, because the claims have not
yet arisen, it may be difficult for the court to determine how closely
these claims will resemble those of the attorney's existing clients."3 2
Indeed, the fact that so little is known about these future claims is
one reason why the court may have trouble estimating the total value
of the class's claims. Even so, the court's informational task is less
onerous than estimating the expected recovery of all claims, because
the court does not have to guess at the odds of recovery or the likely
amount of recovery.
Estimating the ratio between the lawyer's fee and the client's net
recovery raises slightly different informational issues. Courts should
not experience much difficulty in determining the nature of the fee
arrangement between the lawyer and her clients. The problem,
however, is that the lawyer's cap of the recovery is often a function of
the size of the recovery."3 If so, then the court cannot precisely
determine the fee ratio without knowing the expected recovery. For
example, assume that the fee arrangement gives the lawyer 30% of
the first 100 recovered, 25% of the next 100 recovered, 20% of the
next 100 recovered, and 15% of any amount above that. If the
131. See McNeill v. New York City Hous. Auth., 719 F. Supp. 233, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
132. For example, claims may vary in the amount of damages sustained and evidence of
causation of injury or contributory negligence. See Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication:
Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REv. 561, 572 (1993).
133. This is true both of private fee agreements and court-established fees for class action
trials. See generally Charles Silver, A Restitutionay Theory of Attoneys'Fees in Class Actions, 76
CoRNELL L. REV. 656 (1991).
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expected recovery is 200, then the fee-compensation ratio will be
0.38;11 but if the expected recovery is 400, then the ratio will be
0.29.13
It is impossible to calculate a priori the degree of error in judicial
estimations of the fee-compensation ratio. It seems reasonable to
assume, however, that estimating the attorney's contingent fee is less
error-prone than estimating the expected judgment in the case. For
example, suppose that in a given case the judge underestimates the
expected judgment by a factor of two. Such a mistake is unlikely to
translate into an error of comparable magnitude in estimating the
attorney's contingent fee. l" 6
D. Sample Applications
This Article now delineates how the model would prescribe the
optimal fee cap in different types of class action settings.
1. Trial class actions
The easiest cases to analyze are those in which a class has been
certified for trial in a single jurisdiction 37 before completion of
settlement negotiations. For our purposes, the critical features of
such cases are generally the following: (1) the class counsel is
selected in advance; and (2) the attorney's "share of the claims" is
simply one, or 100%; that is, counsel will be taking her contingent fee
from each of the claims in the class action.
Applying the analysis under these circumstances is straightforward.
Assume that the "alternative proceeding" in the event there is no
classwide settlement is a single, classwide trial, which will determine
both the defendant's liability and the total damages paid to the class.
The optimal fee cap is simply equal to the fee-compensation ratio that
would obtain if the case went to trial. Thus, if class counsel would
receive some given fraction of the class recovery in the event that the
case were to go to trial, then counsel should also receive no more
134. The lawyer gets 0.3(100) + 0.25(100) = 55; the client gets 200-55 = 145; and 55/145 =
0.38.
135. The lawyer gets 0.3(100) + 0.25(100) + 0.2(100) + 0.15(100) = 90; the client gets 400 -
90 = 310; and 90/310 = 0.29.
136. In the above example, suppose the judge estimates the expected recovery to be 200,
when in fact it is 400. In such a case, the judge will estimate the attorney's fee to be 27.5%,
when in fact it is 22.5%.
137. If there are several "competing" class actions, each with a different lead counsel, then
class counsel effectively has not been designated in advance, because the defendant can
negotiate with each of the different lawyers.
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than that fraction of the class recovery in a settlement that she has
negotiated.
Matters are a bit more complicated, though essentially similar, if the
"alternative proceeding" consists of a classwide trial only on certain
common issues. Suppose, for example, that if there is no class
settlement, then there will be a classwide trial on issues relating to the
defendant's conduct, followed (if necessary) by a series of individual
trials on issues concerning each claimant's conduct and damages.
Assume further that class counsel will act as attorney in the classwide
trial, but that different lawyers will serve as counsel in the individual
trials. The court's task is to estimate the fraction of each claim that
class counsel would receive if the case did not settle before a classwide
trial. That fraction is the optimal fee cap.
2. Settlement class actions
The analysis will now focus on class actions that are certified for
settlement purposes only. In such cases, if there is no classwide
settlement, claims will be resolved on an individual rather than a
classwide basis. For these purposes, the critical features of settlement
class actions are that: (1) the class counsel's share of the claims in
alternative proceedings is typically less than 100%; and (2) the
counsel is not designated in advance of the settlement negotiation
process. These features significantly affect the optimal fee cap
analysis.
First, they affect the attorney's share of the claims in alternative
proceedings. Typically, no single lawyer will have been retained by all
the- members of the class."a Indeed, no single lawyer's client base
will be more than a small fraction of the class as a whole. As a result,
the appropriate fee cap for a lawyer who negotiates a classwide
settlement will be only a small fraction of the contingent fee cap that
she has agreed on with clients.
Table 3 provides a numerical example of how low the fee cap
plausibly may be in certain cases. Suppose a given lawyer negotiates
a classwide settlement. This table indicates the optimal fee cap for
the lawyer, given the attorney's share of claims and the contingent fee
that she expects to earn on each claim." 9 Assume, for example,
that the lawyer has ten clients who are in the class, and that the
lawyer is working on a one-third contingent fee on those claims. In
138. See supra note 10 and accompanying text; Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class
Actions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1183, 1192 (1982).
139. We assume in this example that the contingent fee is the same whether the case is
resolved in alternative proceedings or in a classwide settlement negotiated by some other lawyer.
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this case, counsel's share of the client's recovery is equal to 50%.1 °
If the class consists of 10,000 members, then the lawyer's share of the
claims is roughly 1/1000. The optimal fee cap is then 0.05%, or 1/20
of 1%.
TABLE 3
Numerical Example: Optimal Fee Caps in Settlement Class Actions
comFeation Attorney's share of claims
ratio 1/10 1/100 1/1,000 1/10,000
.5 D* = 5% O* =.5% D* = .05% D* =.005%
.33 3.3% .33% .033% .0033%
.25 2.5% .25% .025% .0025%
.1 1% .1% .01% .001%
The reason the fee cap is so low in" this example is simple: the
smaller the attorney's share of the claims, the less that she has to gain
from alternative proceedings. As a result, all other things being
equal, counsel will be willing to settle the case for a relatively small
amount. For instance, an attorney with a share of 1/1000 of the
claims has much less to gain in alternative proceedings than an
attorney who has 100% of the claims. All else being equal, therefore,
counsel will be prepared to settle for much less than she would if the
attorney had 100% of the claims. 41 To counteract that tendency,
the court must impose a very low fee cap, so as to induce counsel to
demand a relatively large settlement. Counsel will then receive a very
small fraction of this larger settlement.
The fact that the representative is not designated by the court in
advance of the settlement negotiation can also alter the analysis. It
changes only if the lawyer's contingent fee in a classwide settlement,
negotiated by a different lawyer, is lower than counsel's contingent fee
in alternative proceedings. As the previous examination demonstrat-
ed, the court needs to use the lower of the two in calculating the fee
cap.
14
140. The fee gives the lawyer one-third and the client two-thirds of the recovery, so the
lawyer's share is equal to half of the client's total recovery.
141. For further discussion of this point, see Hay, supra note 18, at 487-90.
142. See supra Part VA
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VII. SUBCLASSES AND DISTRIBUTIONAL CONCERNS
To this point the focus has been on the amount paid in settlement
to the class as a whole, without regard to its distribution among class
members. The discussion now turns to how the settlement treats
different groups within the class.
A. The Problem of Distribution
Critics of class action settlements often assert that settlements may
favor some groups within the class at the expense of others.
1 41
Thus, for example, in a mass tort setting, a settlement might be
relatively generous to claimants who have already brought suit, while
leaving little money available for future claimants."' Generally
stated, the criticism holds that a settlement may give members of
group A in the class the value of their claims, while denying the
members of some other group B the fair value of their claims. This
Part considers the extent to which fee caps can address this problem.
To examine the issue, it is necessary to make a simple revision of
the settlement model to capture the notion of subclasses. Suppose a
settlement takes the form of a schedule (Sa, SB, P), where a is the
amount paid to subclass A in the class; S' is the amount paid to
subclass B; and Fis the amount paid to class counsel. The court seeks
to ensure, if possible, that each subclass collects the expected value of
its claims in alternative proceedings.
This objective differs from the earlier formulation of the court's
objective insofar as the court is not concerned simply with the size of
the overall settlement amount paid to the class members after the
counsel's fee is deducted. Rather, the court is also concerned with
how that payment is divided among the two subclasses. Thus, for
example, suppose that the overall settlement amount collected by the
class exceeds the expected value of the class' claims, and that the full
amount is distributed to subclass A. From the court's perspective, this
is a bad outcome, because matters would be better if each subclass
collected the value of its claims from the distribution. The question
arises, then, as to what extent the court can use a fee cap to ensure
that each subclass receives the value of its claims.
143. See Morawetz, supra note 1, at 5-7; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of
Entrepreneurial Litigation: BalancingFairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L.
REv. 877, 916 (1987).
144. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 135-55.
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B. Effects of the Optimal Fee Cap
The fee cap examined in the foregoing analysis limits counsel's
compensation to a figure equal to some fraction of the amount paid
to the class as a whole. Thus, if the fee cap is set, say, at 10% the
counsel collects no more than ten cents for every dollar received by
the class itself, regardless of whether that dollar goes to members of
subclass A or instead to members of subclass B. A natural threshold
question is how such a fee cap affects bias on the part of the class
counsel and the defendant to favor a particular subclass. One arrives
at the following result: If the class counsel receives the same cap of the
amount recovered by each subclass, then the settling parties have no incentive
to give a greater settlement amount to one subclass than to any other. More
precisely, the settling parties have no reason to prefer giving a dollar
to subclass A rather than giving a dollar to subclass B.
The reasoning behind this result is fairly obvious. The defendant
is indifferent to paying a dollar to A and paying a dollar to B; in
either case, the defendant pays a dollar. In addition, class counsel's
situation is the same; the attorney receives the same fraction of that
dollar no matter which subclass it goes to. For example, the settling
parties will be indifferent between a settlement that gives 50 to A and
100 to B, and a settlement that gives 100 to subclass A and 50 to
subclass B. The defendant's total payment, and the counsel's total
recovery, are the same under either settlement. Thus, they have no
reason to prefer one over the other.
The next result follows logically from this point. Recall the
definition of the optimal fee cap: the fee cap that ensures that class
counsel will not accept a settlement unless it gives the class as a whole
the value of its claims. Assume that the court identifies the optimal
fee cap accordingly, and suppose further that this fee cap applies to
the recovery paid to each subclass."4 In general, application of the
optimal fee cap will have the following effects: (1) relatively small
subclasses will receive more than the value of their claims; and
(2) relatively large subclasses will receive less than the value of their
claims.
146
To see why this occurs, suppose that subclass A's claims have a total
value of 100, while those of subclass B have a total value of 50.
145. If the fee cap is 10%, then counsel receives 10% of the amount paid, no matter how
the remainder is divided among the subclasses.
146. The reference here is not to the number of claimants in the subclass, but to the value
of its claims relative to other subclasses. Thus, by "relatively large," we mean that the value of
the subclass's claims is greater than that of other subclasses.
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Assume that the optimal fee induces class counsel to demand no less
than 150 in settlement. For reasons set further above, the parties
have no incentive to give one subclass more than the other subclass;
both the defendant and the class counsel will be inclined to accept
any settlement involving a total class recovery of 150. In effect, the
settling parties will choose randomly among settlements totaling 150.
On average, then, each subclass will tend to collect 75-meaning A
collects too little while B collects too much.
The court may reject a settlement that does not, in the court's view,
fairly apportion the recovery among subclasses.147  The threat of
such judicial intervention may motivate the settling parties at the
apportioning stage. Once again, however, the court's ability to
directly regulate the terms of settlement is constrained by its limited
information; the court may not know the relative sizes of the
subclasses, and it cannot tell whether a given subclass should get 50
or 100. In addition, the court may not be able to ascertain the
subclasses' relative shares of the settlement, as it cannot tell whether
a given subclass is in fact getting 50 or 100.
For these reasons, the above generalization captures the likely
tendency of class action settlements, though there is no way of knowing
the magnitude of that tendency. The court cannot verify directly that
each subclass receives the value of its claims, and the optimal fee cap
gives the settling parties no incentive to achieve such an apportion-
ment. As defined in this Article, the optimal fee cap will do no better
than ensure that the class as a whole receives in settlement the value
of its claims. It cannot solve distributional problems within the class.
C. The Judicial Dilemma
If the premise that the optimal fee cap cannot address distribution
issues is true, is the derivation of the optimal fee cap a failure?
Perhaps the optimal fee cap should be redefined for cases where a
settlement agreement allocates payments among different subclasses.
The new definition might be as follows: The optimal fee cap ensures
that each subclass-not just the class as a whole-receives the value
of its claims.
Unfortunately, such a fee cap does not exist. The point can be
summarized as follows: If counsel represents more than one subclass, then
no fee cap can ensure that each subclass receives the value of its claims in
settlement. More precisely, if counsel (or a candidate for the role of
147. See generally Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions-urisdiction and Effect ofJudnent, 32
U. ILL. L. REv. 555, 555-67 (1938).
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counsel) negotiates a settlement that binds more than one subclass,
there is no fee cap the court can apply that will both make settlement
feasible and ensure that each subclass receives the value of its claims.
Any fee cap that makes settlement feasible will also, by its nature,
make it possible for a subclass to receive less than the value of its
claims.
This result was apparent with uniform fee caps-fee caps that give
counsel the same cap of the amount paid to each subclass."
Under that type of fee cap, the settling parties will care only about the
size of the total settlement paid to the class without regard for the
allocation among subclasses. Thus, if the settling parties agree on
some aggregate settlement amount, then they wil be happy to give
the whole amount to A, while leaving nothing for B. Alternatively,
they will also be happy to give the whole amount to B, while leaving
nothing for A. The imposition of a uniform fee cap cannot prevent
either result.
What about a non-uniform fee cap? Such a fee cap-whereby the
counsel's fraction of the settlement depends on whom the settlement
is paid to-introduces a positive bias in favor of one subclass. In
particular, it encourages the settling parties to distribute the entire
settlement (or as much as possible) to the subclass for whom the fee
cap is highest. For example, suppose that the fee cap is structured to
give the counsel 10% of the amount paid to subclass A, but 20% of
the amount paid to subclass B. It is easy to see that the settling
parties will give as little as possible to subclass A. For each dollar paid
in settlement, the class counsel would rather see that dollar go to B
than to A, and the defendant is indifferent between giving the dollar
to A or B. If possible, the settling parties will give the whole amount
toB.
Thus, neither uniform nor non-uniform fee caps can ensure that
the settling parties will give each subclass the value of its claims.
Uniform fee caps make the settling parties indifferent about
distributional issues, while non-uniform fee caps bias the parties in
favor of some subclasses over others. Whether indifference or bias is
preferable is unimportant for present purposes.1" The critical
point is that no fee cap provides the settling parties with an incentive
to distribute a settlement among subclasses according to the value of
each subclass's claims.
148. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
149. Sometimes the court may want to bias the parties in favor of some subclasses.
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The source of the problem here is that class counsel represents
more than one subclass. The court may, of course, counteract the
problem by giving each subclass its own counsel, each financially
independent of the others, and each with the authority to reject a
settlement on behalf of the subclass she represents. 5 The court
would then derive a fee cap for each counsel, in accordance with the
analysis in Parts V and VI above. This would be the counsel's
exclusive compensation, and there would be no sharing of fees among
counsel for different subclasses."' Acting under that fee cap, each
counsel would refuse any settlement that provided her subclass with
less than the value of its claims in alternative proceedings.
The drawback to such an approach is that it multiplies the
complexity of negotiating a classwide settlement. Giving each subclass
its own counsel, with veto power over settlement, introduces problems
of coordination and strategic bargaining that are less prevalent when
the entire class is represented by a single attorney.'52 In a case
where multiple attorneys represent various subclasses, the odds of a
classwide settlement drop accordingly. This Article does not address
whether the benefits of individual counseling outweigh these
problems. It is enough to observe that, once again, the court faces a
tradeoff between the goal of encouraging a classwide settlement and
the goal of ensuring that class members receive the value of their
claims.
CONCLUSION
The importance of fee caps for the protection of the class members
in settlement obviously depends on the constraints identified at the
outset of the analysis; the more binding these constraints are, the
greater the need to use fee regulation to give class counsel the proper
incentives. Thus, if the court lacks the information necessary to
evaluate the propriety of a settlement, and if class members lack the
ability to police its soundness,153 then imposing the appropriate fee
cap will be relatively critical. If the court and the class members can
evaluate the settlement accurately, then setting the appropriate fee
cap will be less pressing. These other protective devices are rarely
150. If counsel is not designated in advance, then the court would have to prohibit a
candidate from negotiating on behalf of more than one subclass.
151. Thus, counsel for subclass A could not pay counsel for subclass B to induce the latter
to accept a settlement.
152. See Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the Histmy of
Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REv. 213, 215-20 (1990).
153. One way that class members might police the soundness of the settlement is by opting
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perfect, however, so the problem of designing appropriate incentive
structures for class counsel will be a-significant task for courts in most
cases. This Article furnishes a framework for approaching the
problem.
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APPENDIX
A. The Model
Assume there are n candidates for class counsel. Define the
following notation:
Si - Amount received by the class members in a settle-
ment negotiated by the ith candidate;
F - Amount received by the counsel in a settlement
negotiated by the ith candidate.
We assume, except in section E below, that settling generates the
same costs to the counsel as alternative proceedings; that the settling
parties are symmetrically informed; and that candidates are risk-
neutral.
B. The Basis for Fee Regulation
Here we derive the results presented in Part IVA of the text. To
determine the amount recovered by the class members, consider a
settlement entered into by the jth candidate. Let
- Minimum allowable settlement."
We will show that any schedule in which Sj > S is pareto-inferior to
one in which S. = S. Consider some settlement schedule (S, F1) such
that Sj > S. Now, in place of that schedule, substitute a new schedule
(S, F) such that S + Fj = Sj +F This equality implies (because Sj > S)
that F > F As a result, class counsel will strictly prefer the second
schedule to the first, while the defendant will be indifferent between
them.
Now consider the sum recovered by counsel as her fee. We have
seen that in any settlement reached, S = S. Thus, the only matter for
the parties to bargain over is the size of F. Let
154. It is assumed that this variable is independent of who the counsel is. Relaxing this
assumption has no effect on the qualitative conclusions of the analysis.
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Gi - The ith candidate's anticipated profit from the case
if she does not reach a settlement with the defendant
(G> 0);
H Defendant's expected loss in alternative proceedings.
(1) Suppose counsel is designated in advance by the court. Assume
the jth candidate is selected. The minimum value of F, acceptable to
the counsel is Gf; the maximum value of Fj acceptable to the defen-
dant is H- S. We thus have Gj_ Fj <__H- S. (2) Now suppose counsel
is not designated in advance. The defendant can, in effect, conduct
a reverse auction among the candidates, settling with the low bidder.
Let candidates k and I be, respectively, the candidates who stand to
gain the least if they fail to settle with the defendant. 5 The
defendant will settle with k, because k will be the lowest bidder; and
in equilibrium, the defendant will not pay more than the minimum
amount acceptable to 4 because if k demanded more than that, she
would be underbid by .156 We thus have G <-- F < G1.
C. Effects of a Fee Cap
Here we derive the results presented in Part IVB the text. Let
- Fee cap applied to the ith candidate in the event she
settles with the defendant (D > 0).
The fee cap is binding on the settlement negotiations, in the sense
that (F S) will be chosen in such a way that the equality F1 = DiSi
holds.157
Counsel will not agree to any value of S unless CD,. > G.. From
inspection, it is clear that j's minimum settlement demand on S
increases as Dj decreases. Regarding the likelihood of settlement,
observe that the defendant will not agree to any settlement unless
(1+(D)S _ H. Thus, settlement is infeasible because there is no value
of S acceptable to both parties if
155. More precisely, (r < G < GC for all i ;' {,}.
156. These points follow from the well-developed literature on auctions. See, e.g., Paul
Milgrom, The Economics of Competitive Bidding. A Selective Survey, in SOCIAL GOALS AND SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION 261 (L. Huirwicz et al. eds., 1985).
157. To see this, it suffices to show that any schedule where F< O(S + 1) is pareto-inferior
to one in which F= C(S +.F). Consider some settlement schedule (S, 1), together withaa ceiling
(D, such that F< cD(S+ fi). Now, in place of that schedule, substitute a new schedule (Sj) such
that F= ((S+ 1). This equality implies that S< S because Fhas been held constant. As a
result, the defendant will strictly prefer the second schedule to the first, while class counsel will
be indifferent between them.
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Assume that the court is uncertain of the value of the terms on the
right-hand side of (Al). As the value of c1, goes up, so does the
probability that (Al) does not hold; hence, raising (D has the effect
of increasing the likelihood (from the court's perspective) that
settlement is feasible between the parties.
D. The Optimal Fee Cap
Here we derive the results presented in Part VA of the text. Let
Wi C lass members' net expected recovery from defen-
dant on all claims the class in alternative proceed-
ings, net of the expected amount taken by the ith
candidate.
The court's objective is to ensure that S. > W for all candidates. Thus,
(D-4 is the fee cap that ensures that the ith candidate will not settle
unless Si> Wi.
Suppose the jth candidate is designated class counsel in advance.
Let
a - Fractional share of WI that the ith candidate would
recover in alternative proceedings (0-5 a _< 1).
By definition, we have aiWi = Gi. If D = oj, then j will not agree to
a settlement unless S 1 W. Thus, %* =
Now suppose no counsel is designated in advance. Let
Pi -- The ith candidate's fractional share of a class settle-
ment negotiated by a different candidate (0 P :5
1).159
We will examine the candidates' behavior in Nash equilibrium. Begin
by considering some candidate I's best response to the actions of the
other candidates. If no candidate k offers to settle for less than the
158. Expression (Al) is obtained by rearranging terms in the counsel's minimum demand
figure and, the defendant's maximum offer figure.
159. Thus, if candidate j negotiates a settlement Sj, then candidate i gets Aj.
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defendant's reservation price,"6 then I will be willing to settle for
any amount that gives her more than aW. Thus, counsel's minimum
demand on S will be at least W if
0 1: a. (A2)
Suppose, however, that some other candidate k offers to settle for
some amount Sk that the defendant will accept unless I makes an
equal or lower offer. In such a case, I will match the offer (and
undercut it by a tiny amount)16' if and only if f1jSk < (IS h. Thus, if
S is acceptable to the defendant, lwill refrain from undercutting the
offer if
01 _< P1. (AS)
From this analysis it follows that if both (A2) and (A) hold for all
candidates, then there is no Nash equilibrium in which the case
settles for less than S = W 62 If, instead, either (A2) or (AS) fails to
hold for some candidate (s), then the case may settle for less than W
For example, if (A2) fails to hold for the kth candidate, the above
analysis implies the existence of such an equilibrium."6 Similarly,
if (AS) fails to hold for the kth candidate, counsel may in equilibrium
agree to settle for less than W.11
The solution to the court's problem is therefore to choose the
maximum fee cap that satisfies both (A2) and (A). Choosing that
ceiling, rather than a lower one, maximizes the chances that
160. That is, the defendant's reservation price is the amount the defendant stands to lose
in alternative proceedings.
161. If PjSk < d(DS, then it is assumed there exists some lower settlement amount S such that
162. To see this, suppose k's strategy is to agree to a settlement Sk < W. From the above, no
candidate will match or undercut Sk As a result, k can improve her position by insisting on a
larger settlement figure. This action makes k better off, whether or not the defendant agrees
to the larger figure. By assumption, DkS k < akW. As between settling for Sk and not settling at
all, candidate k is better off not choosing to settle.
163. One such equilibrium occurs when k agrees to settle forjust above [a.W(1 - 0 1/ t
and the other candidates demand some higher amount. It is easily verified that no candidate
has any incentive to change her strategy in such an equilibrium, and that in the resulting
equilibrium the class collects less than (1-a) W.
164. Indeed, if (AS) fails to hold for several candidates, the unique equilibrium may be one
in which the candidates bid their way down to the minimum allowable settlement amount, S.
To see this, assume (A) does not hold for either candidate k or L Consider any strategy pair
(S, S) such that the defendant accepts S,, Because (AS) does not hold, we know that from k's
standpoint, strategy is dominated by a new Sk' such that the defendant accepts Sk. Seesupranote
162. By parallel reasoning, I will want to underbid &. It follows that no equilibrium can be
sustained when the class receives more than S in settlement
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settlement will be feasible, while ensuring that the settlement amount
will not be below W. Thus, (D* = min (a, 0).
E. Pmperties of the Optimal Fee Cap
Here we derive the results of Part V.B in the text. Suppose Oj* =
aj. Plugging that into Dj = Gj, and recalling that G = ajW, we see
that settlement is feasible provided that (l+aj) W 5 H, which is true by
assumption. Suppose, instead, that (D* = O3j. Plugging that into cIjSj
= G, we see that settlement is feasible if f3j < ajW/H, which may or may
not hold.
E Additional Factors Bearing on the Optimal Fee Cap
Here we derive the results presented in Part V.C of the text.
Assume that F,* is the optimal fee cap for the jth candidate when the
model's assumptions hold. For brevity's sake, we assume j is designat-
ed in advance. The analysis is similar, but more involved, if counsel
is not designated in advance.
(1) Litigation Costs. Let -denote the jth candidate's litigation costs
in alternative proceedings (J < W). In such a case, we have Gj = ajW-
X.. Plugging that into DS) = G, and setting Si - W we have
D < (A4)
The fee cap must satisfy (A4), or candidate j will be willing to settle
for less than W. Observe that (A4) is less than a, provided that . is
positive.
(2) Attorney Beliefs. Let Wj' represent the jth candidate's estimate
of the value of W. The candidate's minimum settlement demand
satisfies DjS = ajWj. Setting S equal to WI gives (Ij* = ajWj/W. If
W,' < W, then (D,* < aj.
(3) Risk Aversion. To consider the effect of counsel risk aversion,
assume that some risk attaches to the outcome of alternative proceed-
ings, and that counsel is risk-averse. We can let - denote the
disutility sustained by j, which she would not sustain if risk-neutral,
from going to alternative proceedings. The analysis in (a) then
applies directly.
G. Identifying the Optimal Fee Cap
Here we derive the results presented in Part VI of the text. Let Q.
denote the ith candidate's fraction of the total claims (0 < Q< 1); let
/ ' denote the ith candidate's fee-compensation ratio in alternative
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proceedings (0 < Ra < 1); and let .S denote the ith candidate's fee-
compensation ratio in a class settlement negotiated by a different
candidate (0 </M < 1). By definition, we have ai = Q A9, and P. =
QS. We can then apply the analysis from section D of this Appen-
dix.165
H. Subclasses and the Problem of Distribution
We now derive the results presented in Part VII of the text.
Assume, without loss of generality, that the class consists of two
subclasses A and B. Suppose further that the defendant is bargaining
with the jth candidate. Let SA denote the total settlement paid to
subclass A; let DjA denote the fee cap applied to the amount recov-
ered by subclass A; and use analogous notation for subclass B. The
defendant's total payment is given by (1+DA)Sa+(l+cDj)S , and the
class counsel's total recovery in settlement is given by 0jSa+DjSB.
Begin by considering the relative treatment of the two subclasses
under the optimal (unitary) fee cap. (1) Suppose, first, that (D= tIf.
Consider some schedule (A, P) that is acceptable to both settling
parties. The settling parties will be indifferent among all settlements
(Sa,SB) satisfying Sa+SB _P+. If all such settlements are permissible,
then none of these settlements are more likely than any other to be
selected. Thus, in expected terms, we have SA = SB = /(§+§).
(2) Suppose, next, that W > WV. We know from the above that (in
expected terms) S' = S' when DA = (Df. It follows that under ()*, we
have Wt - SA > WV - S . Thus, under 1*, subclass A will receive less
than subclass B, relative to the expected value of its claims.
Next, consider the structure of the optimal fee cap. (1) Consider
a unitary fee cap. Assume that (DA = 1f. Consider any schedule (P,
S) that is acceptable to both settling parties. The settling parties will
be indifferent between that schedule and a new schedule (a, $8)
where A = 0 and $B = A + &B.166 For this reason, it is evident that
there is no way of assuring both that Sa > Wt and that S" > WV3.
(2) Now consider a non-unitary fee cap. Suppose that <C (Df.
Consider any schedule (&, S) that is acceptable to both settling
parties. An argument analogous to the one above indicates that there
is some other schedule ($, $) where $' = 0, as to which the
defendant is indifferent between the two schedules, while class
counsel strictly prefers the latter. Thus, so long as S' > 0, there is
165. See supra Appendix Part D.
166. More generally, the settling parties may be willing to enter into a settlement that gives
subclass A the minimum amount allowed by the court.
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some other settlement schedule that gives less to subclass A, and is
pareto superior from the standpoint of the settling parties.
167
167. More generally, the unique equilibrium is one in which subclass A receives the
minimum amount allowed by the court.
